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We show that even when the exchange rate cannot be devalued, a small set of conventional fiscal instruments
can robustly replicate the real allocations attained under a nominal exchange rate devaluation in a standard
New Keynesian open economy environment. We perform the analysis under alternative pricing assumptions—
producer or local currency pricing, along with nominal wage stickiness; under alternative asset market
structures, and for anticipated and unanticipated devaluations. There are two types of fiscal policies
equivalent to an exchange rate devaluation—one, a uniform increase in import tariff and export subsidy,
and two, a value-added tax increase and a uniform payroll tax reduction. When the devaluations are
anticipated, these policies need to be supplemented with a consumption tax reduction and an income
tax increase. These policies have zero impact on fiscal revenues. In certain cases equivalence requires,
in addition, a partial default on foreign bond holders. We discuss the issues of implementation of these























Exchange rate devaluations have long been proposed as a desirable policy response to
macroeconomic shocks that impair a country’s competitiveness in the presence of price
and wage rigidities. Milton Friedman famously argued for ￿exible exchange rates on
these grounds. Yet countries that wish to or have to maintain a ￿xed exchange rate
(for instance, because they belong to a currency union) cannot resort to exchange rate
devaluations. The question then becomes: How can ￿scal policy be used to mimic an
exchange rate devaluation, that is, generate the same real outcomes as those following a
nominal exchange rate devaluation, while keeping the nominal exchange rate ￿xed?
This question about ￿scal devaluations dates back to the period of the gold standard
when countries could not devalue their currencies. At that time, Keynes (1931) had
conjectured that a uniform ad valorem tari￿ on all imports plus a uniform subsidy on all
exports would have the same impact as an exchange rate devaluation. The current crisis
in the Euro area has once again brought ￿scal devaluations to the forefront of policy.
The Euro has been blamed for the inability of countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain and
Ireland to devalue their exchange rates and restore their competitiveness in international
markets.1 These statements are sometimes accompanied with calls for countries to exit
the Euro. At the same time suggestions have been made to raise competitiveness through
￿scal devaluations using value-added taxes and payroll subsidies. 2 Despite discussions in
policy circles, there is little formal analysis of the equivalence between ￿scal devaluations
and exchange rate devaluations. This is an area where the policy debate is ahead of
academic knowledge. This paper is intended to bridge this gap, by providing a complete
analysis of ￿scal devaluations in a workhorse dynamic stochastic general equilibrium New
Keynesian open economy model.
We de￿ne a ￿scal devaluation of size δt at date t to be a set of ￿scal polices that imple-
ments the same real (consumption, output, labor supply) allocation as under a nominal
exchange rate devaluation of size δt, but holding the nominal exchange rate ￿xed. We
explore a general path of δt, including both expected and unexpected devaluations. Since
the nature of price rigidity￿whether prices are set in the currency of the producers or in
local currency￿is central for the real e￿ects of nominal devaluations (see, for example,
Lane, 2001; Corsetti, 2008), we study separately the case of producer (PCP) and local
currency pricing (LCP), allowing in both cases for nominal wage rigidity. 3 Additionally,
we allow for di￿erent international asset market structures, including balanced trade,
complete markets, and incomplete markets with international trade in risk-free nominal
bonds and equities.
1 For popular policy writings on the topic see, for example, Feldstein in the Financial Times in February
2010 (http://www.nber.org/feldstein/ft02172010.html), Krugman in the New York Times in May 2010
(http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/why-devalue/), Roubini in the Financial Times in June
2011 (http://www.economonitor.com/nouriel/2011/06/13/the-eurozone-heads-for-break-up/).
2For example, Farhi and Werning (http://web.mit.edu/iwerning/Public/VAT.pdf); Cavallo and
Cottani on VoxEU (http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4666); IMF Press Release on Portugal
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11160.htm) and IMF’s September 2011 ￿Fiscal Moni-
tor￿ (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2011/02/fmindex.htm).
3PCP refers to the case when prices are sticky in the currency of the producer (exporter), while LCP
is the case when prices are sticky in the currency of the consumer (importer) of the good.
1A main ￿nding is that, despite the di￿erences in allocations that accompany these
various speci￿cations, there exists a small set of ￿scal instruments that can robustly
replicate the e￿ects of nominal exchange rate devaluations across all speci￿cations. The
exact details of which instruments need to be used depend on the extent of completeness
of asset markets, the currency denomination of bonds and the expected or unexpected
nature of devaluations.
There are two types of ￿scal policies that generate ￿scal devaluations. The ￿rst policy
involves a uniform increase in import tari￿s and export subsidies. The second policy in-
volves a uniform increase in value-added taxes and a reduction in payroll taxes (e.g., social
security contributions). Both of these policies, in general, need to be accompanied by a
uniform reduction in consumption taxes and an increase in income taxes. 4 However, under
some circumstances, changes in consumption and income taxes can be dispensed with.
When this latter option is possible depends on the extent of completeness of asset markets
and whether the exchange rate movements that are being mimicked are anticipated or
unanticipated.
To provide intuition for the mechanisms at play behind ￿scal devaluations, consider
the case of producer currency pricing (PCP). One of the channels through which a nominal
devaluation raises relative output at home is through a deterioration of home’s terms of
trade that makes home goods less expensive relative to foreign goods. This movement
in the terms of trade can be mimicked either through an export subsidy or through an
increase in the value-added tax (which is reimbursed to exporters and levied on importers).
Additionally, to ensure that prices at home are the same as under a nominal devaluation,
the export subsidy must be accompanied by a uniform import tari￿, while an increase in
the value-added tax needs to be o￿set with a reduction in the payroll tax.
When is a reduction in consumption taxes and an increase in income taxes required?
Without a reduction in consumption taxes, ￿scal devaluations result in an appreciated
real exchange rate relative to a nominal devaluation. This is because ￿scal devaluations,
despite having the same e￿ect on the terms of trade, lead to an increase in the relative
price of the home consumption bundle￿an e￿ect absent under nominal devaluation. This
di￿erence is of no consequence for the real allocation when trade is balanced or when the
devaluation is unexpected and asset markets are incomplete, as neither risk-sharing nor
saving decisions are a￿ected under these circumstances. As a result, precisely in these
two cases, we can dispense with the adjustment in consumption and income taxes. By
contrast, with expected devaluations, in the absence of an adjustment in consumption and
income taxes, the di￿erent behavior of the real exchange rate under nominal and ￿scal
devaluations induces di￿erent savings and portfolio decisions. These e￿ects then need to
be undone with a reduction in consumption taxes and an o￿setting increase in income
taxes. This allows to fully mimic the behavior of the real exchange rate under a nominal
devaluation.
In the case of incomplete markets we highlight the role of the currency denomination of
debt. When bonds are denominated in the foreign currency, no additional instruments are
4Consumption tax is equivalent to a sales tax that is applied only to ￿nal goods, and not to intermediate
goods. In our setup all goods are ￿nal, and hence consumption and sales taxes are always equivalent.
Further, under tari￿-based policy, an increase in income tax should extend to both wage income and
dividend income, while under VAT-based policy dividend-income tax should be left unchanged.
2required for a ￿scal devaluation. By contrast when international bonds are denominated
in the home currency, the proposed set of tax instruments does not su￿ce. Equivalence
then requires a partial default by the home country. Speci￿cally, a nominal devaluation
depletes the foreign-currency value of home’s external debt if it was denominated in home
currency. The proposed limited set of ￿scal instruments cannot replicate this e￿ect on
home’s foreign obligations. This is why a ￿scal devaluation under these circumstances
must be accompanied by a partial default on home-currency debt of the home country.
We emphasize that the proposed ￿scal devaluation policies are robust across a number
of environments, despite the fact that the actual allocations induced by devaluations are
sensitive to the details of the environment. Speci￿cally, for a given asset market structure,
￿scal devaluations work robustly independently of the degree of wage and price stickiness,
and of the type of pricing￿whether local or producer currency. Importantly, they are
also revenue-neutral for the government.
We additionally consider a series of extensions that are important for implementation.
The extensions include introducing capital as the second variable input and allowing for
non-symmetric short-run pass-through of VAT and payroll taxes into prices. We also
discuss the implementation of ￿scal devaluations by individual countries in a currency
union.
In the case where production involves the use of capital as a variable input, the VAT-
based ￿scal devaluation requires an additional capital subsidy to ￿rms, because without it
￿rms will have an incentive to substitute labor for capital, an e￿ect absent under a nominal
devaluation. In the case of a one-time unexpected devaluation, where a consumption
subsidy is not used, this is the only additional instrument required. As a more general
principle, all variable production inputs, apart from intermediates, need to be subsidized
uniformly under a VAT-based devaluation, while no such subsidies are needed under a
tari￿-based devaluation.
Our baseline analysis assumes symmetric pass-through of VAT and the payroll tax
into prices, both when prices are sticky and when they change. Although as we argue
this is a natural assumption to make, we consider an extension in which in the short run
prices are indexed to VAT and the payroll tax with di￿erential degrees of pass-through.
Under these circumstances a ￿scal devaluation requires a non-uniform adjustment in the
taxes. Speci￿cally, if the short-run pass-through of VAT is larger than that of a payroll
tax then a one-time devaluation can be replicated with the same increase in VAT as in
the benchmark model, but with a larger reduction in the payroll tax, with the di￿erence
gradually phased out as prices adjust over time.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 evaluates equivalence in a stylized
static environment that is useful to convey the intuition for what follows in the dynamic
analysis. Section 3 extends the results to a fully-￿edged dynamic environment that fea-
tures endogenous saving and portfolio choice decisions under a variety of asset market
structures, as well as an interest-elastic money demand. Section 4 provides a numerical
illustration of the equilibrium dynamics under nominal and ￿scal devaluations against
that under ￿xed exchange rate and passive ￿scal policy. For our numerical example,
we consider a small open economy with sticky wages and ￿exible prices, hit by a neg-
ative productivity shock. Under these circumstances, devaluation is the optimal policy,
replicating the ￿exible-price, ￿exible-wage allocation. Lastly, Section 5 discusses several
3implementation issues through a series of extensions.
Related literature Our paper contributes to a long literature, both positive and nor-
mative, that analyzes how to replicate the e￿ects of exchange rate devaluations with
￿scal instruments. The tari￿-cum-export subsidy and the VAT increase-cum-payroll tax
reduction are intuitive ￿scal policies to replicate the e￿ects of a nominal devaluations
on international relative prices, and accordingly have been discussed before in the policy
and academic literature. Poterba, Rotemberg, and Summers (1986) emphasize the fact
that tax changes that would otherwise be neutral if prices and wages were ￿exible have
short-run macroeconomic e￿ects when prices or wages are sticky. Most recently, Staiger
and Sykes (2010) explore the equivalence using import tari￿s and export subsidies in a
partial equilibrium static environment with sticky or ￿exible prices, and under balanced
trade. While the equivalence between a uniform tari￿-cum-subsidy and a devaluation has
a long tradition in the literature (as surveyed in Staiger and Sykes, 2010), most of the
earlier analysis was conducted in static endowment economies (or with ￿xed labor sup-
ply). Berglas (1974) provides an equivalence argument for nominal devaluations, using
VAT and tari￿-based policies, in a reduced-form model without micro-foundations, no
labor supply and without specifying the nature of asset markets. 5 Our departure from
this literature is to perform a dynamic general equilibrium analysis with varying degrees
of price rigidity, alternative asset market assumptions and for expected and unexpected
devaluations. In contrast to the earlier literature, we allow for dynamic price setting as
in the New Keynesian literature, endogenous labor supply, savings and portfolio choice
decisions, as well as interest-elastic money demand. In doing so, we learn that the tari￿-
cum-subsidy and VAT-cum-payroll ￿scal interventions do not generally su￿ce to attain
equivalence. In the general case, additional tax instruments such as consumption taxes,
income taxes or partial default are required. Moreover, some of the conclusions regarding
which tax instruments su￿ce (such as import tari￿ only for local currency pricing as dis-
cussed in Staiger and Sykes, 2010) do not carry through in our more general environment.
Furthermore, and this is more surprising, despite the di￿erent allocations being mimicked
under di￿erent circumstances and a rich set of endogenous margins of adjustment, the
additional instruments required are few in number. In other words, we ￿nd that a small
number of instruments is all that is required to robustly implement ￿scal devaluation
under the fairly rich set of speci￿cations we explore.
This paper is complementary to Adao, Correia, and Teles (2009) who show that any
equilibrium allocation in the ￿exible price, ￿exible exchange rate economy can be imple-
mented with ￿scal and monetary policies that induce stable producer prices and constant
exchange rates. Since the optimal policy is sensitive to details of the environment the
￿scal instruments used will vary across environments and in general will require ￿exibly
time-varying and ￿rm-varying taxes. Our approach is di￿erent and closer in focus to the
previously discussed papers. We analyze simple ￿scal policies that robustly replicate the
e￿ects of nominal devaluations across a wide class of environments, regardless of whether
5The VAT policy with border adjustment has been the focus of Grossman (1980) and Feldstein and
Krugman (1990), however, in an environment with ￿exible exchange rates and prices. Calmfors (1998)
provides a policy discussion of the potential role of VAT and payroll taxes in impacting allocations in a
currency union.
4or not nominal devaluations exactly replicate ￿exible price allocations. We perform the
analysis in a more general environment, with di￿erent types of price and wage sticki-
ness, under a rich array of asset market structures and for expected and unanticipated
devaluations. An attractive feature of our ￿ndings is that the ￿scal adjustments that are
necessary to replicate nominal devaluations are to a large extent not dependent on the
details of the environment.
Another important di￿erence with Adao, Correia, and Teles (2009) lies in the set of
￿scal instruments that we consider. First, their implementation requires time-varying
taxes both at Home and in Foreign. By contrast, ours requires only adjusting taxes
at Home. This is an important advantage because it can be implemented unilaterally.
Second, their implementation relies on income taxes and di￿erential consumption taxes
for local versus imported goods. These taxes are less conventional than payroll and value-
added taxes￿tax instruments that have been proposed as potential candidates in policy
circles (e.g., see IMF Sta￿, 2011).
This paper is also related to Lipi«ska and von Thadden (2009) and Franco (2011) who
quantitatively evaluate the e￿ects of a tax swap from direct (payroll) taxes to indirect
taxes (VAT) under a ￿xed exchange rate. 6 Neither of these studies however explores
equivalence with a nominal devaluation, as we do in this paper. Lastly, the style of this
paper is similar to Correia, Farhi, Nicolini, and Teles (2011) who, building on the general
implementation results of Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008), use ￿scal instruments to
replicate the e￿ects of the optimal monetary policy when the zero-lower bound on nominal
interest rate is binding.
2 Static Analysis
We start with a one-period (static) setup with an arbitrary degree of price and wage
￿exibility, and consider in turn the cases of producer and local currency price setting.
The model features two countries￿Home (H) and Foreign (F). Foreign follows a passive
policy of ￿xed money supply M∗, while Home in addition to the money supply M can
potentially use six di￿erent ￿scal instruments￿import and export tari￿s, a value-added
tax (with border adjustment), 7 a payroll tax paid by the producers, and consumption
and income taxes paid by the consumers. We consider various degrees of capital account
openness￿￿nancial autarky (balanced trade), complete risk sharing with Arrow-Debreu
securities, and an arbitrary net foreign asset position of the countries in home or foreign
currency that allows us to study the valuation e￿ects associated with devaluations.
Our central result is that there are two types of ￿scal policies that can attain the
same e￿ects as a nominal devaluation while at the same time maintaining a ￿xed nominal
exchange rate. We call these policies ￿scal devaluations. The ￿rst policy involves an
increase in import tari￿ coupled with an equivalent increase in export subsidy. The other
policy involves an increase in the value-added tax coupled with an equivalent reduction
in the payroll tax. Under balanced trade no other ￿scal instrument is needed, while with
6Other quantitative analysis includes Boscam, Diaz, Domenech, Ferri, Perez, and Puch (2011) for
Spain.
7A VAT with border adjustment is reimbursed to the exporters and levied on the importers.
5perfect international risk sharing adjustments in consumption and income taxes are also
required.
An expansion in the home money supply may or may not be needed in addition to
￿scal policy, however this adjustment happens automatically if the government chooses
an exchange rate peg as its monetary policy (which in particular is the case for members
of a currency union). As an alternative setup we could consider a cashless economy with
an exchange rate peg (or an interest rate rule in the dynamic environment of Section 3).
All our equivalence results hold a fortiori in a cashless economy that is described by the
same equilibrium system but without a money demand equation and exogenous money
supply.
The following is important for the reader to keep in mind. In our formal analysis, we
start from a situation where taxes are zero. This assumption is made only for simplicity
and ease of exposition. Our results generalize straightforwardly to a situation where initial
taxes are not zero. Indeed, our results characterize the changes in taxes that are necessary
to engineer a ￿scal devaluation. For example, a payroll subsidy should be interpreted as
a reduction in payroll taxes if the economy starts in a situation where payroll taxes are
positive. Similarly, a VAT should be interpreted as an increase in the VAT if the economy
starts in a situation with a positive VAT. The extension with non-zero initial taxes is
explicitly considered in Section 5.
2.1 Model setup
Our static model features two countries and two goods, one produced at home and the
other produced at foreign. Goods are produced from labor using a linear technology with
productivity A and A∗ respectively.
Consumers derive utility from both goods and disutility from labor. For simplicity of
exposition we adopt separable constant-elasticity preferences over consumption and leisure
and a Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator over the home and the foreign good. Our
results fully generalize to an environment with a general non-separable utility U(C,N)
and a general consumption aggregator over multiple home and foreign goods. In the
dynamic analysis of Section 3 we consider a more general preference speci￿cation.










where N is the labor supply and C is the consumption aggregator. We allow for home bias












8Our analysis immediately generalizes to the setup with a non-tradable good, as long as the same taxes
apply to the non-tradable-good producers as to the producers of the home tradable good. Empirically, a
relevant case may be when VAT does not apply to certain non-tradable industries, such as construction
and housing. In this case, ￿scal devaluations would simply require reducing the payroll tax only for the
industries which face an increase in VAT.






















Here PH and PF are home-currency prices of the two goods before the consumption tax,
but inclusive of the value-added tax and tari￿s. 9 Similarly, starred prices are foreign-
currency prices of the two goods. Since these price indexes do not incorporate the con-
sumption tax, they must be adjusted for the consumption tax in order to obtain the
consumer prices of the home and foreign consumption baskets.
With Cobb-Douglas preference aggregators, we can write the market clearing condi-

















where Y is production of the home good and PC is the before-consumption-tax expendi-
ture of home consumers, and similarly for foreign. Here γPC/PH, for example, is home
demand for the home-produced good. Note that a consumption tax enters both the
numerator and the denominator in this expression and hence cancels out.
We introduce money into the model by means of cash-in-advance constraints:
PC




where ςc is a consumption subsidy at home. In the next section when we consider a
dynamic environment we study a more general case of interest-elastic money demand.
In this static economy, home households face the following budget constraint:
PC
1 + ςc + M + T ≤
WN
1 + τn +
Π
1 + τd + B
p, (3)
where τn is the labor-income tax, τd is the dividend-income tax, T is a lump-sum tax,
and Bp are home household net foreign assets, possibly state-contingent, converted into
home currency, WN is labor income and Π is ￿rm pro￿ts introduced below. In this static
section, τd plays almost no role. For example, we could either set it to τd = 0 or to
τd = τn. The only results that would be a￿ected are those on the revenue impact of ￿scal
devaluations (Proposition 5). For this reason, we do not specify dividend tax adjustment
until our discussion of this proposition. This irrelevance of dividend tax will not carry
over to our dynamic setup in Section 3, where we specify dividend tax from the outset.
The home government budget constraint is given by
M + T + TR + B
g ≥ 0, (4)
9We assume that consumption subsidies are paid to consumers, while VAT is levied on producers. With
￿exible prices, the incidence of taxation is irrelevant and the two exactly o￿set each other. However, with
nominal price stickiness incidence matters and the VAT and consumption subsidy no longer o￿set each
other in the short run (e.g., see Poterba, Rotemberg, and Summers, 1986). Section 5 discusses the tax
pass-through assumptions necessary for our equivalence results and reviews related empirical evidence.
7where Bg is home government net foreign assets converted into home currency and TR
stands for all non-lump-sum ￿scal revenue of the home government. 10 The two budget
constraints together de￿ne the country-wide budget constraint, where B = Bp + Bg
are the total home-country net foreign assets. The foreign household and government
budget constraints are symmetric with the exception that Foreign does not use ￿scal
instruments. This assumption is made only for ease of exposition and has no consequence
for our results, as long as foreign responds symmetrically to a ￿scal as well as nominal
devaluation. International asset market clearing requires B + B∗E = 0 state by state,
where B∗ is foreign-country net foreign assets converted into foreign currency and E is
the nominal exchange rate. In this static setting, we take the asset positions B and B∗
as exogenous, and we endogenize savings and portfolio choice decisions in the dynamic
analysis of Section 3.
We analyze ￿rst the case of producer currency pricing and then the case of local
currency pricing, allowing for an arbitrary degree of price stickiness. In both cases we
also allow for an arbitrary degree of wage stickiness. For each case, we consider in turn
various assumptions about international capital ￿ows starting from the case of ￿nancial
autarky and balanced trade. In all these cases, we characterize combinations of tax
changes and money supplies in the home country that perfectly replicate the real e￿ects
of a devaluation of the home currency but leave the nominal exchange rate unchanged,
given that foreign follows a passive policy of constant money supply and no changes in
taxes.
2.2 Producer currency pricing
We assume that prices and wages are partially (or fully) sticky in the beginning of the
period, before productivity shocks and government policies are realized.
Wage setting We adopt the following speci￿cation for the equilibrium wage rate:












where θw ∈ [0,1] is the degree of wage stickiness, with θw = 1 corresponding to ￿xed wages
and θw = 0 corresponding to fully ￿exible wages. Accordingly, ¯ W is the preset wage, while
the term in the square bracket is the ￿exible wage. We denote by µw ≥ 1 the wage markup
which may arise under imperfectly competitive labor market. The remaining terms in the
square brackets de￿ne the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between labor and
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where the ￿rst two terms are the income taxes levied on and the consumption subsidy paid to home
households; the next two terms are the value-added tax paid by and the payroll subsidy received by home
￿rms; the last two terms are the import tari￿ and the VAT border adjustment paid by foreign exporters
and the export subsidies to domestic ￿rms, as we discuss below.
8consumption, where τn is an income tax and ςc is a consumption subsidy.11 A symmetric
equation (without taxes) characterizes the wage in the foreign country. This wage setting
speci￿cation is motivated by the Calvo wage-setting model with monopsonistic labor
supply of multiple types and a fraction 1−θw of types adjusting wages after the realization
of the shocks. We spell out this model in greater detail when we carry out our dynamic
analysis.
Price setting Under producer currency pricing, a home producer sets the same pro-
ducer price, inclusive of the value-added tax, in home currency for both markets accord-
ing to:











where θp ∈ [0,1] is the measure of price stickiness, ¯ PH is the preset price and the term
in the square bracket is the ￿exible price, by analogy with wage setting (5). We denote
by µp ≥ 1 the price markup, while the remaining terms in the square bracket are the
￿rm’s marginal cost, where ςp is a payroll subsidy and τv is a value-added tax.12 The
foreign good price, P ∗
F, is set symmetrically in the foreign currency, but with no payroll or
value-added taxes. Note that by choosing θw and θp we can consider arbitrary degrees of
wage and price stickiness.13 Furthermore, our results do not depend on whether foreign
has the same or di￿erent price and wage stickiness parameters.
International prices Finally, we discuss international price setting. Under our as-
sumption of PCP, home producers receive the same price from sales at home and abroad.
Exports entail a subsidy, ςx, and also the value-added tax is reimbursed at the border.







1 + ςx, (7)
where E is the nominal exchange rate measured as units of home currency per unit of
foreign currency so that higher values of E imply a depreciation of home currency. Ex-
pression (7) is a variant of the law of one price in our economy with tari￿s and taxes.





1 − τv , (8)
where τm is the import tari￿, and the value-added tax is levied on imports at the border. 14
11With a linear production technology, labor supply N equals Y=A.
12Under PCP, the pro￿ts of a home ￿rm can be written as Π = (1 − v)PHY − (1 − &p)WN, where
Y = AN is total output of the ￿rm.
13The case of w = 1 can also be interpreted as binding downward wage rigidity or minimum wage.
14PF denotes the price to consumers before the consumption tax. The way we de￿ned taxes, foreign
￿rms receive (1 − v)PF=(1 + m) in home currency per unit exported, while the home government’s
revenue is (v + m)PF=(1 + m) per unit imported.
9Capital account openness We now spell out various assumptions regarding capital
account openness. Consider ￿rst the case of ￿nancial autarky, or balanced trade, which
we model by imposing B = Bp + Bg ≡ 0 in (3)￿(4), and consequently B∗ ≡ 0. A
constant zero net foreign asset position implies balanced trade, P ∗
FCF = P ∗
HC∗
H. This can







that is, the equality of total consumption expenditure and total production revenues in
foreign. When trade is balanced and the import tari￿ equals the export subsidy ( τm = ςx),
the home government makes no revenues from trade policy, and as a result PC = PHY
also holds in equilibrium (to verify this, combine (3) and (4) and impose τm = ςx).
Next consider the case of perfect risk sharing. In this case, at the beginning of the
period, before the realization of productivity and policy, private agents can trade Arrow-












c) ≡ Q, (10)
where Q is the consumer-price real exchange rate and λ is the constant of proportionality.
Without consequences for our results, we normalize λ = 1. Net foreign asset positions of
the countries must be such that consumption satis￿es (10) state by state.
Finally, consider the case where home’s net foreign assets B are composed of an arbi-




Combining the foreign country budget constraints with asset market clearing, we obtain











Nominal exchange rate We have fully described the equilibrium structure of the PCP
economy under various asset market structures. We now characterize the equilibrium
nominal exchange rate. We have:17
15Consider the foreign budget constraints in this case:
P∗C∗ + M∗ + T∗ = W ∗N∗ + Π∗ = P∗
FY ∗;
M∗ + T∗ = 0:








F), which together with (9) implies trade balance P∗
FCF = P∗
HC∗
H, that is the equality
of foreign export revenues and foreign import expenditure.
16The same condition can be derived from the home budget constraints (3)￿(4), a consequence of
Walras Law.
17Proof of Lemma 1: (i) follows from trade balance (9), cash-in-advance (2) and market clearing (1).
Combining these three and the law of one price (8) yields (12). (ii) follows from complete risk-sharing con-
dition (10) and cash-in-advance (2) after rearranging terms and using the de￿nition of the real exchange
rate. (iii) follows from (11), together with (2), (1) and (8), just like in (i).
10Lemma 1 In a static PCP economy, the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is given by:

















(iii) when the foreign asset position is a portfolio of home- and foreign-currency assets,
E =
1−τv




where Bh and Bf∗ are respectively home- and foreign-currency assets of home.
In all cases, the nominal exchange rate depends on monetary and ￿scal policy. However
this relationship is di￿erent across the three asset market setups. In the case of balanced
trade this relationship is most direct, while in the other two cases it is partially mediated
by the adjustment to shocks of prices or net foreign liabilities. Naturally, (12) is a special
case of (14) with Bh ≡ Bf∗ ≡ 0.
Fiscal devaluations We can now formulate our main result. A nominal devaluation
of size δ is the outcome of an increase in the home money supply M so that ∆E/E = δ,
without any change in taxes. We de￿ne a ￿scal devaluation of size δ to be a set of
￿scal polices, together with an adjustment in money supply, which implements the same
consumption, labor, and output allocation as a nominal devaluation of size δ, but holding
the nominal exchange rate ￿xed.
We introduce two propositions that describe ￿scal devaluations under various asset
market structures:
Proposition 1 In a static PCP economy under balanced trade or foreign-currency net
foreign assets position (Bf∗ ̸= 0, Bh = 0 state-by-state), a ￿scal devaluation of size δ can
be attained by the following set of ￿scal policies:
τ
m = ς
x = δ, ς
c = τ






















where ε can be chosen arbitrarily, including ε = 0 and ε = δ.
Proof: Note that both (FD′) and (FD′′) have the same e￿ect on international prices in
(7) and (8) as a nominal devaluation ∆E/E = δ. Furthermore, for given PH and P ∗
F, from
(2) and (1) we see that a nominal and a ￿scal devaluation will have the same e￿ect on
11consumption and output in the two countries as long as the change in M(1+ςc) is the same
for all devaluation policies. Given prices, consumption and output, wage setting in (5) is
the same across all devaluations. Given wages, price setting in (6) is the same across all
devaluations. We went full circle, and now only need to check that ￿scal devaluations keep
the nominal exchange rate unchanged. In the case of balanced trade and foreign-currency
debt, a nominal devaluation requires ∆M/M = ∆E/E = δ, while ￿scal devaluations
hold E constant and set, according to (12) and (14),
(
M′(1 + ςc) − M
)
/M = δ, where
M′ = M + ∆M. Given ςc = ε, we obtain the expression for ∆M/M. 
Proposition 2 In a static PCP economy under complete international risk-sharing, a
￿scal devaluation of size δ can be attained by the following set of ￿scal policies:
τ
m = ς
x = δ, ς
c = τ


























where ∆Q/Q is the change in the real exchange rate following a nominal devaluation of
the exchange rate of size δ.
Proof: The proof follows along the exact same lines as that of Proposition 1. The
di￿erence is the following. Under complete international risk sharing, nominal and ￿scal
devaluations must have the same e￿ect on the real exchange rate Q in order to keep the
relative consumption of the two countries unchanged, as follows from the risk-sharing con-
dition (10). From (13), under nominal devaluation the change in M equals the change in
E/Q
 1
 , while under ￿scal devaluation the change in M must equal the change in Q−  1
 .
In all cases, E(1 + ςc) and M(1 + ςc) are unchanged, and therefore indeed consumption
and output allocations must be the same. 
The ￿rst type of ￿scal devaluation (FD ′) relies on an import tari￿ τm combined with
a uniform export subsidy ςx, a policy advocated early on by Keynes and recently studied
in Staiger and Sykes (2010). The second ￿scal devaluation policy (FD ′′) is driven by a
value-added tax τv with border adjustment,18 combined with a payroll subsidy ςp. Of
course, an appropriate combination of these two ￿scal devaluation policies would also
attain the same result.
The key to understanding the mechanism behind these ￿scal devaluations is their e￿ect












1 − τv, (15)
where the second equality follows from the law of one price (7). Therefore, given P ∗
F/PH,
the terms of trade can be equivalently a￿ected by a nominal or a ￿scal devaluation. The
remainder of the ￿scal policies in (FD ′) and (FD′′) are needed to o￿set the additional
18In contrast to the results in Grossman (1980) and Feldstein and Krugman (1990) derived under
￿exible exchange rate and prices, border adjustment is indispensable for our results.
12consequences of ￿scal devaluations, in particular to make sure that P ∗
F/PH remains the
same as under a nominal devaluation. Thus, an increase in the export subsidy must be
accompanied by an increase in the import tari￿ in order to ensure the same movement
in international prices as under a nominal devaluation (see (8)). Similarly, an increase in
the VAT must be o￿set by a reduction in the payroll tax in order to neutralize the e￿ects
on price setting absent under a nominal devaluation (see (6)).
We now discuss the role of consumption subsidies. From (2) and (1), we see that the
e￿ect of a consumption subsidy on consumption and output is the same as the e￿ect of an
expansion in money supply. Indeed, under balanced trade and foreign-currency risk-free
debt, a consumption subsidy is not essential and it can be replaced by an increase in money
supply (corresponding to ε = 0 in Proposition 1).19 From (12) and (14) note that this
expansion in money supply does not lead to a movement in the nominal exchange rate as
long as M(1+τc) increases in proportion to the import tari￿ or value-added tax. A ￿scal
devaluation without a consumption subsidy requires an increase in the money supply in
order to keep trade balanced (otherwise there would be a trade surplus). Another way of
looking at it is that a nominal devaluation is a consequence of expansionary demand-side
policy (increase in M), which must also be part of a ￿scal devaluation in order to replicate
the same e￿ects on consumption and output.
With complete international risk-sharing, a consumption subsidy is needed even if we
allow the home money supply to adjust. This is because the proposed tari￿ and VAT
changes, although they a￿ect the terms of trade in the same way as a nominal devaluation,
have the opposite e￿ect on the real exchange rate. Using the de￿nition of the real exchange
rate in (10) together with (7)￿(8), we can write
Q = S
2γ−1 (1 − τv)(1 + ςc)
(1 + ςx)γ(1 + τm)1−γ.
Therefore, given the movement in terms of trade S = P ∗
F/P ∗
H, ￿scal devaluations, in the
absence of consumption subsidies , lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate Q =
P ∗E/P. Both ￿scal and nominal devaluations make home exports cheaper relative to for-
eign exports. However, nominal devaluations achieve this outcome by making all home-
produced goods relatively cheaper, while ￿scal devaluations make home consumption
relatively more expensive by taxing imports. This leads to a di￿erential movement in the
real exchange rate, which under complete markets a￿ects the relative consumption alloca-
tion across countries.20 A consumption subsidy is then needed to mimic the depreciation
of the real exchange rate which happens under a nominal devaluation. In turn, this con-
sumption subsidy limits the need for a monetary expansion since it has the same e￿ect
on consumption through the cash-in-advance constraint (2). Finally, an income tax τn is
19Conversely, under these circumstances a ￿scal devaluation can be attained with no change in the
home money supply, by using instead the consumption subsidy and income tax (the case of " = ).
Under complete markets, however, both the use of a consumption subsidy and a change in the home
money supply are needed.
20Under balanced trade the relative consumption allocation does not depend on the real exchange rate.
This is why a ￿scal devaluation does not necessarily need to mimic the behavior of the real exchange
rate, and consumption subsidies can be dispensed with. In the dynamic analysis of Section 3 we study
how these conclusions generalize once we endogenize saving and portfolio choice decisions.
13only needed to o￿set the labor wedge created by the consumption subsidy, as can be seen
from (5).
Also note that both proposed ￿scal devaluations are long-run neutral, in the sense
that they have no e￿ect on consumption and output allocation when prices and wages
are fully ￿exible. Propositions 1 and 2 apply to arbitrary degrees of wage and price
stickiness. When prices or wages are sticky, ￿scal devaluations have the same real e￿ects
on the economy as those brought about by a nominal devaluation driven by an expansion
in the money supply. It is important to note however that the e￿ects of a δ-devaluation
(nominal or ￿scal) are di￿erent for di￿erent asset market structures. 21
Valuation E￿ects22 Exchange rate movements a￿ect the real value of the debt that
Home owes to Foreign depending on the currency denomination of the debt. When
the debt is denominated in foreign currency (that is, Bf∗ < 0), Proposition 1 holds.
On the other hand, when debt is (partially or wholly) denominated in home currency
(Bh ̸= 0), the ￿scal instruments speci￿ed in Proposition 1 no longer su￿ce. Instead
they must be supplemented with a partial default d = δ/(1 + δ), or a tax, on the home-
currency-denominated debt of the home country held by foreign, in order to replicate
the e￿ects of a devaluation. That is, the post-devaluation debt position of home be-
comes (1 − d)Bh = Bh/(1 + δ). The di￿erence in the equivalence proposition between
foreign- and home-currency denominated debt can be understood by studying the foreign
budget constraint (11). When Bh = 0 then a nominal devaluation has no e￿ect on the
foreign-currency value of the debt. If instead Bh < 0 a nominal devaluation reduces the
foreign-currency value of the debt owed by home to foreign to Bh/(1 + δ). The partial
default d is then needed to exactly mimic this reduction in the foreign-currency value of
debt in a ￿scal devaluation when the exchange rate is held ￿xed.
An alternative approach to understanding the di￿erence is to study home’s consoli-





1 + τm(PHY − PC).
If Home has positive debt, repayment requires (PHY − PC) > 0. If this debt is denom-
inated in foreign currency, then a devaluation has the direct e￿ect of raising the local
currency value of the debt −EBf∗, and increases the payments in local currency to the
foreign country. This same e￿ect follows an increase in a uniform import tari￿-cum-export
subsidy or an increase in value-added tax-cum-payroll tax reduction. Now if the debt is
denominated in home currency, a devaluation has no direct e￿ect on the value of debt in
home currency, but the increase in taxes will raise the transfers to the foreign country.
To undo this requires a partial default/tax on foreign holders of home debt.
We summarize this discussion in:
21Under di￿erent asset market structures, a given devaluation is attained by a di￿erent expansion in the
money supply. Speci￿cally, under balanced trade a -devaluation requires ∆M=M = , or alternatively
&c = . However, under complete international risk sharing, a nominal devaluation is associated with
a depreciation of the real exchange rate that in turn may limit or amplify the required money supply
expansion (see (13)).
22For discussion of valuation e￿ects see, for example, Gourinchas and Rey (2007).
14Proposition 3 With home-currency debt (−Bh ̸= 0), a ￿scal devaluation of size δ can
be attained by the same set of ￿scal policies as in Proposition 1, combined with a partial
default on the home-currency denominated debt of the home country, d = δ/(1 + δ), and
a suitable adjustment in the money supply. 23
Note that this partial default is a direct transfer of wealth from foreign to home
households. When home has home-currency assets (Bh > 0), equivalence requires debt
forgiveness to foreign that reduces home’s assets to the level (1 − d)Bh. An implication
of this analysis is that in the case when there are heterogenous agents in the economy
with di￿erent portfolios of foreign- and home-currency assets, exchange rate devaluations
will e￿ect the cross-sectional distribution of wealth di￿erently from a ￿scal devaluation,
unless all agents with home-currency liabilities partially default on them with the haircut
given by d = δ/(1 + δ).
2.3 Local currency pricing
We now consider brie￿y the alternative case of local currency pricing. We show that the
results are exactly the same under local currency pricing. This is surprising because the
mechanism of a nominal devaluation under LCP is quite di￿erent from that under PCP.
While under PCP a nominal devaluation a￿ects international relative consumer prices,
under LCP it a￿ects the pro￿t margins of the ￿rms. In both cases, these are exactly the
e￿ects attained by a ￿scal devaluation.
Formally, the international law of one price (7)￿(8) no longer holds and ￿rms set prices
separately for domestic and foreign consumers. In line with the logic of local currency
pricing, we assume that prices are preset inclusive of all taxes and subsidies, apart from
the consumption subsidy given directly to the consumers. Conditions (7)￿(8) are replaced
with the following price-setting equations:
P
∗
























that parallel (6). From (16)￿(17) we see that as international prices adjust, they are
a￿ected in the same way by ￿scal and nominal devaluations. However when prices are
￿xed, neither devaluation has an e￿ect on international prices.
With ￿xed pricess, however, pro￿ts must adjust. For example, the pro￿ts of a repre-










1 + τm − W
∗N
∗.
From this expression it is clear that a ￿scal devaluation a￿ects pro￿ts Π∗ in the same way
as a nominal devaluation.
23The required adjustment in the money supply can be inferred from equation (14), given the desired
size of the devaluation, ￿scal policies used, and the amount of home-currency debt.
15All other equilibrium conditions remain unchanged under LCP, including the country
budget constraints. With this we can characterize equilibrium nominal exchange rate
under LCP:
Lemma 2 Lemma 1 applies to the case of LCP as well, and the nominal exchange rate
is given by (12), (13) or (14) depending on the structure of the asset market.
Proof: The proof for the case of complete markets does not rely on the type of price
setting, PCP or LCP. The case of trade balance and non-zero net foreign liabilities is more






























where we have used the fact that B∗ = Bp∗+Bg∗ = −B/E = −Bh/E−Bf∗ in equilibrium.














which immediately implies (14), and hence (12) as a special case when Bh ≡ Bf∗ ≡ 0 and
trade is balanced. 
With Lemma 2, we can immediately generalize the results in Proposition 1, 2 and 3
to the case of LCP (the proof follows exactly the same steps as above):
Proposition 4 With LCP, ￿scal policies (FD′) and (FD′′) constitute ￿scal devaluations
under balanced trade, complete international risk sharing, and foreign-currency risk-free
debt, just like under PCP: Propositions 1, 2 and 3 apply.
We have identi￿ed a robust set of ￿scal policies￿￿scal devaluations￿which achieve
the same allocations as nominal devaluations, but keep the exchange rate unchanged.
It is important to note that the allocations themselves are very di￿erent under LCP
and PCP. As surveyed in Lane (2001), a monetary expansion under PCP has a positive
spillover for the foreign country through a depreciation of the home terms of trade. Under
PCP, nominal devaluation generates a production boom at home and a consumption
boom worldwide. By contrast, a monetary expansion under LCP is beggar-thy-neighbor
due to a terms of trade depreciation of foreign and a reduction in foreign ￿rms’ pro￿t
margins.24 Under LCP, a nominal devaluation generates a consumption boom at home









and nominal (as well as ￿scal) devaluation leads to its appreciation, in contrast to the PCP case where
the terms of trade depreciates (see (15)), as emphasized in Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (2000).
16and a production boom worldwide. It is immediate to extend our results to environments
with a mix of producer and local currency pricing, as for example in Devereux and Engel
(2007).
2.4 Revenue Neutrality
The last question we address before moving on to the dynamic analysis, is whether the
proposed ￿scal policies lead to government budget surplus or de￿cit. We have:
Proposition 5 Under both PCP and LCP, as regards non-lump-sum tax revenue TR:
(FD′) is revenue-neutral if all taxes are adjusted by the same amount ( ε = δ) or if trade is
balanced, and in both cases, if the dividend tax is set to τd = ε; (FD′′) is revenue-neutral
if all taxes are adjusted by the same amount ( ε = δ), but dividend tax is set to τd = 0.
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τdΠ





















Under (FD′), pro￿ts are given by





both under PCP and LCP, where ¯ E is the constant value of the nominal exchange rate.
Under LCP, P ∗
H is the sticky consumer price, while under PCP it is given by the law of
one price P ∗
H = PH/[¯ E(1 + δ)], where PH is the sticky producer price. Furthermore, tax
revenues in this case are given by
TR =
τd




































where the second equality substitutes in the expression for pro￿ts and rearranges terms
using PC = PHCH+PFCF. We also used ςc = τn = ε with either ε = δ as in Proposition 2
or as a free parameter as in Proposition 1. Hence, we can always set τd = ε and ε = δ,
and have TR = 0. If we choose ε = 0, TR has the same sign as the trade balance of
foreign.
Similarly, in the case of (FD′′)
TR =
τd





























With ε = δ and τd = 0, TR = 0. When ε < δ and τd = 0, TR ≥ 0 whenever PC > WN. 
17The key conclusion here is that our proposed ￿scal devaluations can always be imple-
mented with a balanced budget, an important property for a viable devaluation policy
under most circumstances. Note that by focusing on non-lump-sum government revenues
TR, we have e￿ectively excluded seigniorage from our analysis of revenue neutrality. 25
However, apart from seigniorage, TR de￿nes the primary ￿scal surplus of the home coun-
try.
Finally, we emphasize the robustness of our revenue-neutrality result. First, it applies
equally to both PCP and LCP environments. Second, this argument directly extends to
a dynamic environment, as the one considered in the next section, since a dynamic ￿scal
devaluation can be implemented with TR = 0 period-by-period.26
3 Dynamic Analysis
In this section we extend our results from the static model to a fully-￿edged New Key-
nesian dynamic stochastic model, which incorporates standard Calvo sticky prices and
wages.27 Again we allow for price setting both in producer and local currency. We start
with a model without capital and later analyze how the introduction of capital changes
our conclusions. In contrast to a static model, within a dynamic framework households
face endogenous savings and portfolio choice decisions. We consider di￿erent asset mar-
ket structures, including complete markets, home or foreign-currency risk-free bonds, and
international trade in equities. 28 Additionally, we generalize our setup to allow for interest-
elastic dynamic money demand. Finally, a dynamic framework allows us to discuss sepa-
rately both one-time unexpected devaluations, as well as expected dynamic devaluations.
Overall, the proposed ￿scal devaluations work robustly in our signi￿cantly more general
dynamic environment, with certain modi￿cations and caveats that we emphasize below. 29
3.1 Baseline setup
For concreteness, we begin by laying out the general features of our model economy for
the case of complete international asset markets and Producer Currency Pricing (PCP).
25Note that lump-sum taxes in our analysis are only used in order to transfer the seigniorage revenues
back to the public.
26 Period-by-period neutrality is no longer true when a ￿scal devaluation does not involve consumption
subsidies and income taxes. As shown in the proof, when &c = n = d = 0 under (FD′), government
revenues from a ￿scal devaluation are proportional to home trade de￿cit. Therefore, the net present value
of revenues from ￿scal devaluation, by the intertemporal budget constraint, must be proportional to the
initial net foreign assets of home. Under (FD ′′), the same is true when &c = n = 0 and d = −=(1+),
that is, when a dividend income subsidy is in place. With d = 0, revenues from the ￿scal devaluation
are greater (more positive or less negative) in proportion to the aggregate pro￿ts of the economy.
27Our equivalence results can be generalized to a menu cost model in which the menu cost is given in
real units, e.g. in labor, since in this case the decision to adjust prices will depend only on real variables
(including relative prices) which stay unchanged across nominal and ￿scal devaluations.
28The analysis of the case of ￿nancial autarky (balanced trade) is essentially identical to that of our
static model, and is omitted for brevity.
29For simplicity, we again start from a situation where taxes are zero. As discussed in the static
section, our results generalize immediately to a situation where initial taxes are not zero. Indeed, our
results characterize the changes in taxes that are necessary to engineer a ￿scal devaluation (see Section 5).
18We later consider in turn alternative international asset market structures, and then show
the robustness of our results under Local Currency Pricing (LCP). Finally, we consider
an extension with capital.
Consumer problem The model features two countries, each populated by a continuum
of symmetric households. Households are indexed by h ∈ [0,1], but we often omit the






where Ct denotes consumption, Nt is labor, and mt = Mt(1 + ςc
t)/Pt denotes real money
balances; Pt is the consumer price before consumption subsidy ςc
t, which is why Pt/(1+ςc
t)
de￿ates nominal money balances in the utility function.

































, γ > 1/2,



















with ρ > 1. The assumptions of a CES upper-tier consumption aggregator and separable
utility in consumption and labor can be immediately generalized without a￿ecting the
results, and we adopt them exclusively to simplify notation.
Note that we have introduced money into the utility function. Our results require
money to enter separably in the utility function except in the case of a one-time unan-
ticipated devaluation as we discuss below. For anticipated devaluations, non-separability
of money in the utility function would generally require an additional tax instrument
such as a tax on cash holdings. The cash-in-advance economy can be thought of as a
special limiting case of money-in-the-utility function with money entering non-separably,
but our baseline results generalize to this limiting case without requiring additional tax
instruments. Note that these cases￿money in the utility function entering separably or
cash-in-advance constraints￿are the focus of the New-Keynesian literature. 30
30Under these two assumptions, the nominal interest rate is the only money market relevant variable for
the rest of the allocation, justifying the focus on the corresponding cashless limit in the New Keynesian
literature (see discussion in Woodford, 2003). As discussed in the previous section, our equivalence results
hold a fortiori in a cashless economy, under an exchange rate peg and a suitable interest rate rule. Here
we can consider the cashless limit explicitly by taking  → 0.
19In each period, each household h chooses consumption Ct, money Mt and state-
contingent one-period bonds Bt+1. It also sets a wage rate Wt, and supplies labor in
order to satisfy demand at this wage rate. We describe the wage setting process below.

















is aggregate pro￿ts of the home ￿rms. As before, τn
t is the labor-income tax, τd
t is the
dividend-income tax, and Tt is the lump-sum tax.
























































where PHt and PFt are the price indexes of home and foreign goods. 31 Finally, household












Foreign households face a symmetric problem with the exception that the foreign
government imposes no taxes or subsidies and foreign consumers have a home bias towards
foreign-produced goods. The optimal choices of foreign consumers are characterized by
similar conditions which we omit for brevity. The foreign-currency nominal stochastic


















, so that the
relative prices PHt=Pt and PFt=Pt are determined by the terms of trade, PFt=PHt.
20discount factor is given by Θ∗
t+1 = Θt+1Et+1/Et, where Et is the nominal exchange rate
de￿ned as in the static analysis. Complete international asset markets allow for perfect












where λ is a constant of proportionality pinned down by the initial net foreign asset
positions of the two countries. 32
Producer problem In each country there is a continuum i ∈ [0,1] of ￿rms producing
di￿erent varieties of goods using a linear technology in labor. Speci￿cally, ￿rm i produces
according to
Yt(i) = AtZt(i)Nt(i),
where At is the aggregate country-wide level of productivity, Zt(i) is idiosyncratic ￿rm
productivity shock, and Nt(i) is the ￿rm’s labor input. Productivity At, {Zt(i)} and their
foreign counterparts follow arbitrary stochastic processes over time.
Under PCP and with CES demand functions, ￿rm i charges the same producer price




t = (1 − τ
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t is the value-added tax (VAT) and ς
p
t is the payroll subsidy. Note that we de￿ne
the producer price to be inclusive of the VAT.
Firm i faces the following demand












where the second equality uses (20) and the fact that the law of one price holds under
PCP (see below).34 At the aggregate, this condition implies market clearing
CHt + C
∗









where Yt is the aggregate real output of the home country. A similar market clearing
conditions holds for aggregate foreign output, Y ∗
t .
32A constancy of  implicitly requires that state-contingent contracts can be conditioned on the real-
izations of home tax policies, including unexpected changes in taxes. This assumption might appear less
than realistic, and we dispense with it once we turn to the analysis of incomplete asset markets.
33Aggregate pro￿ts of the home ￿rms, Πt ≡
 1
0 Πi
tdi, can be written as
Πt = (1 − v
t )PHtYt − (1 − &
p
t )WtNt;
where we used PHtYt =
 1
0 PHt(i)Yt(i)di and Nt ≡
 1
0 Nt(i)di, as we discuss below.
34We also implicitly aggregate across households. Formally, CHt(i) =
 1
0 CHt(h;i)dh, but since house-
holds are ex ante symmetric and have access to complete markets, we have CHt(h;i) = CHt(i) for all h.
21Price setting is subject to a Calvo friction: in any given period, a ￿rm can adjust its
price with probability 1 − θp, and must maintain its previous-period price with probabil-
ity θp. The price ¯ PHt(i) set by a ￿rm that gets to change its price in period t maximizes












subject to the production technology and demand equations given above, and where
Θt,s =
∏s
ℓ=t+1 Θℓ for s > t, Θt,t = 1, and τd
s is the dividend-income, or pro￿t, tax.

























This implies that the preset price ¯ PHt(i) is a constant markup over the weighted-average
expected future marginal costs over the period of price duration. The dynamics of the










where ¯ PHt is the price index for goods that reset prices at t.35
The price-setting problem of foreign ￿rms is identical, with the exception that there
are no taxes or subsidies in the foreign country. The foreign price index PFt follows a



















Foreign prices P ∗
Ht(i) are obtained from home prices by a conversion into foreign currency
and an adjustment for import tari￿s, export subsidies and value-added tax (that is reim-
bursed for exports and levied on imports). Since both countries face the same aggregators
for home and foreign varieties, the law of one price also holds at the aggregate level for
home and foreign goods (but not for consumption goods because of home bias).










, η > 1.
35With no idiosyncratic ￿rm heterogeneity, all ￿rms adjusting prices at t are symmetric and choose the









where we have re-sorted ￿rms so that the ￿rst (1 − p) of them adjust their prices at t. Finally, since
the ￿rms resetting prices in any given period are selected at random, PH,t−1 remains the price index for
￿rms that do not reset prices at t.









0 Nt(i)di is aggregate labor demand in the economy, Wt(h) is wage rate
charged by household h for its variety of labor services and Wt is the wage for a unit of
aggregate labor input in the home economy. 36
Households are subject to a Calvo friction when setting wages: in any given period,
with probability 1 − θw they can adjust their wage, but with probability θw they have to






























This implies that the wage ¯ Wt(h) is preset as a constant markup over the expected
weighted-average between future marginal rates of substitution between labor and con-
sumption and aggregate wage rates, over the duration of the wage. This is a standard
result in the New Keynesian literature, as derived, for example, in Gal￿ (2008).










Foreign wages are set in a symmetric way with the exception that foreign households are
not subject to consumption subsidies or income taxes.















Government We assume that the government must balance its budget each period.
This is without loss of generality since Ricardian equivalence holds in this model. The
government budget constraint in period t is
Mt − Mt−1 + Tt + TRt = 0,
















































23just as in the static economy.37
Combining this together with the household budget constraint and aggregate pro￿ts,
we arrive at the aggregate country budget constraint






















which using the law of one price can be rewritten as: 38







The foreign country aggregate budget constraint is symmetric with Bt + B∗
t = 0 (by
market clearing). It is redundant and can be dropped by Walras law. This completes the
description of the model setup.
3.2 Fiscal devaluations under complete markets
Consider an equilibrium path of our model economy along which the nominal exchange
rate follows
Et = E0(1 + δt) for t ≥ 0.
Here δt denotes the percent nominal devaluation relative to period 0. We refer to such
an equilibrium path as a nominal {δt}-devaluation. Denote by {Mt} the path of home
money supply that is associated with the nominal devaluation. A ￿scal {δt}-devaluation









t }t≥0 of money supply and taxes that achieves the
same equilibrium allocation of consumption, output and labor supply, but for which the
equilibrium exchange rate is ￿xed E′
t ≡ E0 for all t ≥ 0.
Note that, in general, we do not restrict the path of the exchange rate under a nominal
devaluation. For example, one can look at the case of a probabilistic one-time devaluation
where δt follows a Markov process with two states {0,δ} where δ is an absorbing state,
or the case of a deterministic devaluation where δt = 0 for t < T and δt = δ for t ≥ T.
We will also consider an interesting variant, a one-time unexpected devaluation under
which δt = 0 for t < T and δt = δ > 0 with probability one for t ≥ T; in addition
Prt{δt+j = 0} = 1 for t < T and j ≥ 0.
We can now state the main result of this section:
Proposition 6 In a dynamic PCP economy with interest-elastic money demand and com-
























t = δt and τ
d
t = 0 for t ≥ 0, (FDD′′)
37Note that WtNt =
 1
















t . Hence the intertemporal budget constraint can be











24as well as a suitable choice of M′
t for t ≥ 0. Under a one-time unexpected ￿scal devalua-
tion, M′
t/Mt = 1/(1 + δt) and for (FDD′) we can also use τd
t = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Proof: The idea of the proof is to show that all the equilibrium conditions hold for the
allocation associated with the nominal devaluation, with the same prices and wages, but
with a ￿xed exchange rate E′
t = E0 under either (FDD′) or (FDD′′).
First, note from the law of one price equations (25)￿(26) that a ￿scal devaluation
requires the suggested movement in τm
t = ςx
t or in τv
t . Otherwise international relative
prices are di￿erent under the proposed ￿scal devaluation and under the nominal deval-
uation. But then the terms of trade are not the same, leading to a violation of market
clearing (22) for the original allocation.
The international risk sharing condition (21) implies that the consumption subsidy
ςc
t has to follow the suggested path so that the real exchange rate is the same under
the proposed ￿scal devaluation and the nominal devaluation, otherwise original relative
consumption across countries would not satisfy optimal risk sharing.
























Given Pt, both sides of this equation must remain identical under the proposed ￿scal



































Note that under a one-time unanticipated devaluation, the bracket on the right-hand side
is simply 1.
Finally, we verify that wages and prices are the same under the proposed ￿scal de-
valuation and under the nominal devaluation. From the wage setting equation (27) it is
clear that as long as τn
t = ςc
t, and given the path {Pt,Ct,Nt,Wt}, the reset wage ¯ Wt stays
the same. This in turn implies the same path for Wt in (28). Turning to prices, note that












































for s ≥ t.




s) = 1 for all s ≥ 0, and therefore
given the path {Cs,Ps,Ys,PHs,Ws,As}, and with τd
s = 0, the reset prices { ¯ PHt(i)} stay
25the same for all ￿rms, and hence so does PHt. Under (FDD′), however, we need to choose
τd
s = δs in order to achieve this outcome. Under a one-time unexpected devaluation, we
can choose τd
t = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Thus, the proposed set of policies ensures an equilibrium with E′
t = E0 for all t ≥ 0,
and unchanged consumption, output, and labor supply allocations, as well as wages and
prices, as under a nominal {δt}-devaluation. 
Just like in the static model, under complete markets, a ￿scal devaluation requires the
use of a consumption subsidy. This instrument is necessary in order to match the path
of the real exchange rate obtained under a nominal devaluation, which in turn a￿ects
state-contingent transfers and relative consumption allocation across countries.
The fact that money demand is interest-elastic does not require additional tax instru-
ments. If the nominal devaluation is expected, its ￿scal equivalent will involve a di￿erent
path for the nominal interest rate. This requires adjustments in the money supply. For
example an expected stochastic or deterministic one-time nominal devaluation is associ-
ated with an increase in the interest rate di￿erential ( it+1 − i∗
t+1) before the devaluation,
which does not occur under an equivalent ￿scal devaluation. This naturally leads to a
higher money demand at home which needs to be accommodated with a higher money
supply.39 Additionally, a consumption subsidy expands e￿ective real balances for a given
money supply, and hence money supply can be reduced under a ￿scal devaluation relative
to a nominal devaluation, when a consumption subsidy is in place. Both these e￿ects can
be observed in the expression for M′
t/Mt in the proof. When money enters non-separably
into the utility function, our conclusions still hold true for an unexpected devaluation, but
implementing an expected devaluation requires an additional ￿scal instrument a￿ecting
money demand.40
Interestingly, a ￿scal devaluation using tari￿ policy (FDD ′) without an adjustment
in dividend tax has second order e￿ects on price setting. This is because time-varying
consumption taxes change the stochastic discount factor of consumers that is used to
discount ￿rm pro￿ts. These e￿ects are exactly o￿set by the adjustment in the VAT and
the payroll tax under (FDD′′), but under (FDD′) they must be o￿set by an adjustment
in dividend tax, except in the case of a one-time unexpected devaluation.
Importantly, an unexpected one-time nominal devaluation can be mimicked only by
an equally unexpected ￿scal policy change. An unexpected devaluation implies a zero-
probability one-time event. It is important in our complete markets analysis that agents
39Indeed, the di￿erence in the interest rate di￿erential comes from it+1, since i∗
t+1 remains unchanged
across ￿scal and nominal devaluations.
40Suppose money enters non-separably into the utility function. Now the marginal utility of consump-
tion depends on both consumption Ct and the level of real money balances Mt(1 + &c
t)=Pt. Therefore,
risk-sharing and other conditions that involve the SDF (price setting, budget constraints) now depend on
the path of real money balances. Previously, a di￿erential movement in the nominal interest rate could
be o￿set simply by adjusting Mt(1 + &c
t) appropriately (see the proof). However, with non-separability
Mt(1+&c
t) enters not only demand for money as previously, but also the marginal utility of consumption.
In particular, the risk sharing condition now requires Mt(1+&c
t) to be the same across nominal and ￿scal
devaluations. This generates a con￿ict unless it is a one time unexpected devaluation and consequently
the interest rate does not change. More generally, with anticipated devaluations, an equivalent ￿scal
devaluation is possible only with an additional instrument to o￿set the e￿ects of movements in interest
rates on money demand, for instance a tax on money holdings.
26share risk optimally even across these zero-probability events, which requires the use
of international bonds contingent on these zero-probability events. Deviating from this
assumption requires taking a stand on a particular asset market structure. Indeed, we
consider below the case of incomplete markets with trade in risk-free bonds and equities.
3.3 Incomplete asset markets
We now consider a number of cases with incomplete international asset markets. We start
with the case where the only internationally-traded asset is a foreign-currency risk-free
bond. Our results generalize to this case most straightforwardly. We then look at the
case of home-currency risk-free bonds, and international trade in equities. In all these
cases we assume that markets are complete within countries. 41
Foreign-currency bond economy The home representative household’s budget con-




















t is the foreign-currency price of a risk-free bond paying one unit of foreign
currency in all states next period, and B
f
t+1 is the quantity of these bonds held by the
home household.
Most equilibrium condition are the same as with complete markets, with the exception
of the international risk sharing condition (21) and of the country budget constraints (30).










































































t = 0 for all t. One of the two
budget constraints is redundant by Walras Law. We can combine either one of the budget
































This leads us to:
41This assumption emphasizes greater risk-sharing within countries as compared to imperfect inter-
national risk-sharing. It also greatly simpli￿es wage setting, leaving it unchanged from our baseline
framework above.
27Proposition 7 In a dynamic PCP economy with foreign-currency bonds only, (i) a ￿scal
{δt}-devaluation can be achieved either by (FDD′) or by (FDD′′), exactly as in Proposi-
tion 6; (ii) a one-time unexpected ￿scal devaluation can be implemented without the use
of consumption subsidy and income taxes ( ςc
t = τn
t = τd
t = 0 for all t ≥ 0), with the other
￿scal instruments still given by (FDD′) or (FDD′′), and with the same money supply as
under a nominal devaluation (M′
t = Mt for all t ≥ 0).
Proof: (i) The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Proposition 6. The consump-
tion subsidy ςc
t = δt ensures that the new risk-sharing condition (31) is met under the
proposed ￿scal devaluation with E′
t = E0. The use of the VAT τv
t = δt/(1 + δt) or import
tari￿ τm




(ii) Note that under the unexpected devaluation, consumption risk-sharing in (31) is
unaltered if ςc
t ≡ 0 because Prt{Es = 0} = 1 for all t < T, s ≥ t and Prt{Es = δ} = 1 for












With the rest of the ￿scal instruments as in (FDD ′) or (FDD′′), the choice of B
f
t+1 is again
unaltered in (32). Finally, with ςc
t = 0, we need M′
t = Mt in order for (18) to hold. This
is because under an unexpected nominal devaluation 1 + it+1 = 1 + i∗
t+1 = 1/Q∗
t, and the
same is true under an unexpected ￿scal devaluation. 
In contrast to the static case, we cannot generally carry out a ￿scal devaluation in
a dynamic foreign-currency bond economy without using consumption subsidies. This
is because dynamic savings decisions depend on the dynamics of the real exchange rate.
Consumption subsidies are needed in order to replicate the path of the real exchange rate
that would obtain under a nominal devaluation. However, unlike the complete markets
case, only the expected path of the real exchange rate matters, because risk is only
shared in expectation. As a result, we can dispense with consumption subsidies when the
devaluation is one-time unexpected.
What is the intuition behind the di￿erent conclusions for expected and unexpected
devaluations? When devaluations are unexpected, the availability of a foreign-currency
risk-free bond does not a￿ect risk sharing relative to ￿nancial autarky, from the perspec-
tive of sharing risk of a devaluation. As a result, when the devaluations are unexpected,
￿scal devaluations work very much as in a balanced-trade economy. Foreign-currency
risk-free bonds help only to smooth consumption ahead of expected devaluations. When
devaluations are expected, ￿scal devaluations must replicate the e￿ect of expected real
exchange rate movements on optimal savings decisions, requiring the use of a consumption
subsidy.
Home-currency bond We know from the static analysis that partial defaults on home-
currency debt are a necessary ingredient of ￿scal devaluations. We therefore introduce
the possibility of partial defaults on home-currency bonds from the outset, in the form of
a contingent sequence {dt}.


























where Qt is the home-currency price of a home-currency risk-free bond; the bond promises
to pay one unit of home currency at t+1, and dt+1 is the haircut (partial default) on the
holders of the bond. The country budget constraint can now be written as
QtB
h
t+1 − (1 − dt)B
h
























t denotes home’s holdings of home-currency bonds.
A ￿scal {δt}-devaluation now requires:
ς
c




This ensures that the foreign-currency value of the home bonds bh
t = Bh
t /Et−1 is the same
in every period under both policies.42 This in turn guarantees that both the risk-sharing
condition (33) and the country budget constraint (34) still hold under a ￿scal devaluation
for the allocation and prices associated with the nominal devaluation. Importantly, the
partial default required in period t under a ￿scal devaluation is equal to the devaluation
rate that would occur under the nominal devaluation. Hence, a one-time devaluation
requires a concurrent one-time partial default.
As long as we supplement our ￿scal devaluations with an appropriate partial default
policy, the results of our foreign-currency bond economy in Proposition 7 extend straight-
forwardly to the economy with home-currency bonds. The intuition for this result follows
similar lines to that in the static section. We have:
Proposition 8 In a dynamic PCP economy with home-currency bonds, (i) a ￿scal
{δt}-devaluation can be achieved either by (FDD′) or by (FDD′′), exactly as in Proposi-
tion 6, supplemented with a partial default policy 1−dt = (1 + δt−1)/(1 + δt); (ii) a one-
time unexpected ￿scal devaluation of size δ at t = T can be implemented without the use
of consumption subsidy and income taxes ( ςc
t = τn
t = τd
t = 0), with the other ￿scal instru-
ments still given by (FDD′) or (FDD′′), supplemented with an unexpected one-time partial
default on outstanding home-currency debt, dT = δ/(1 + δ), and dt = 0 for all t ̸= T,
while maintaining the same money supply as under a nominal devaluation ( M′
t = Mt).
42To see this, rewrite the home country budget constraint (34) as
Qtbh



























29It is important to clarify our terminology. Home country holds debt when Bh
t < 0,
and in this case a ￿scal devaluation is indeed associated with a partial default of home on
its debt obligations. In the alternative case when home holds net foreign assets, Bh
t > 0,
instead of partial default a ￿scal devaluation requires a partial debt forgiveness to the
foreign country. Both partial default and partial debt forgiveness are direct transfers
between home and foreign households and do not involve government taxation.
Domestic and Foreign Equities We can additionally consider economies with inter-
national trade in equities, that is shares in home and foreign ￿rms. The home budget






























t + Mt−1 − Tt, (35)
where ωt and 1 − ω∗
t are the shares of the home country in home and foreign ￿rms
respectively, and we have used the fact that the sum of shares held by home and foreign
residents have to add up to one. Vt and V ∗
t are date-t cum-dividend home-currency value
of home stock market (i.e., aggregate of all home ￿rms) and foreign-currency value of
foreign stock market respectively. The dividend tax τd
t on pro￿ts of home ￿rms applies
equally to home and foreign shareholders. 43 All the other variables are as de￿ned in



























s = 0. (36)
With this, we can now prove:
Proposition 9 In a dynamic PCP economy with international trade in equities, (i) (FDD′)
and (FDD′′), exactly as in Proposition 6, constitute a ￿scal {δt}-devaluation; (ii) a one-
time unanticipated ￿scal δ-devaluation does not require the use of consumption subsidy
and wage-income tax (ς c
t = τn
t = 0) provided money supply follows the same path as under
nominal devaluation (M′
t = Mt), while dividend-income tax should be used under (FDD′)
and should not be used under (FDD′′), as in Proposition 6.















































s, and optimal risk-sharing conditions (36) below imply that households in both
countries equally assess the valuation of the ￿rms (this must be true in any equilibrium, in which both
countries hold interior equity positions in both home and foreign ￿rms, which for concreteness is the focus
of our analysis).
30The proof of this proposition is somewhat tedious and we provide it in the Appendix.
The idea behind the proof is the following. A nominal devaluation leads to a negative
valuation e￿ect for foreigners holding home equity, and a positive valuation e￿ect for
home shareholders in foreign ￿rms. This must be mimicked under a ￿scal devaluation.
Under (FDD′′) the VAT-plus-payroll subsidy is an e￿ective tax on pro￿ts of home ￿rms,
which reduces the dividends for its shareholders, home and foreign alike. A consumption
subsidy for home households undoes the e￿ects of this ‘pro￿t tax’ for home households,
and as such creates an e￿ective subsidy on holding foreign equity, just like the valuation
e￿ects under nominal devaluation. This also ensures that under (FDD ′′), the risk-sharing
conditions continue to hold for the same portfolio choice as under the nominal devaluation.
As a result, both the risk-sharing conditions and the country budget constraints continue
to hold for the original allocations; the same is true for the rest of the equilibrium system
just like in the proof of Proposition 6. (FDD ′) requires the tax on dividends of home ￿rms
to generate the same negative valuation e￿ects for the foreign shareholders in the home
￿rms.
Under a one-time unanticipated devaluation, risk-sharing conditions continue to hold
even without the use of consumption subsidies, for the same reason we discussed in the
case of foreign-currency bonds. However, in contrast to the case of risk-free bonds where
dividend-income tax is irrelevant, under trade in equities we need to use this instrument in
order to replicate the valuation e￿ects of a nominal devaluation on international portfolio
holdings. A combination of VAT and payroll subsidy leads to a change in the value of the
home ￿rms equivalent to that arising from a nominal devaluation, and hence dividend-
income tax should not be used under this type of ￿scal devaluation.
Naturally, the policies proposed in Proposition 9 still constitute a ￿scal devaluation
when both foreign-currency bonds and equities are traded internationally. Additionally
introducing home-currency debt, a ￿scal devaluation would require a partial default char-
acterized in Proposition 8. In a similar way we can extend the analysis to other as-
set classes without having to solve explicitly for the international portfolio allocation of
countries￿a problem with no general solution (see e.g., Devereux and Sutherland, 2008).
Finally, the dynamic analysis under complete and incomplete markets clari￿es the role
of consumption subsidies in ￿scal devaluations. Consumption subsidies and income taxes
can be dispensed with if devaluation is unanticipated and markets are incomplete (so that
fully unexpected events are not re￿ected in the risk-sharing conditions)￿see Part (ii) of
Propositions 7￿9. In contrast, when either devaluation is anticipated (with a positive
probability) or when markets are complete to the extent that risk-sharing is possible even
in states of the world that happen with probability zero, consumption subsidy and a
uniform income tax are indispensable ingredients of a ￿scal devaluation.
3.4 Local currency pricing
We now o￿er a brief treatment of the LCP case, leaving most formal details to the
Appendix. The main conclusion here is that our results generalize to the case of local
currency pricing. The LCP case is notationally somewhat more tedious, this is why we
choose to separate it out from PCP, but conceptually there are no di￿erences between
the two analyses. We start by summarizing the changes in the equilibrium conditions in
31the LCP case relative to the PCP case. We then explain how the results of the PCP case
extend to the LCP case.
Equilibrium conditions The only fundamental change in the equilibrium conditions
concerns price setting and international prices. The law of one price equations (25) and
(26) no longer hold, and instead home ￿rms set ¯ P ∗
Ht(i) and foreign ￿rms set ¯ PFt(i), when
they get to adjust prices respectively. Our ￿scal devaluations does not rely on whether
￿rms adjust their domestic and international prices on the same dates or with the same
frequency. Firms choose prices to maximize the net present value of pro￿ts in the domestic
and international markets during the duration of the respective price. As a result, we have
two new ￿rst order price-setting conditions for international prices, and we need to adjust
the price-setting equation (23) for the domestic market (and its counterpart for foreign
￿rms). The pro￿ts of home ￿rms from home and foreign sales can be written as:
Π
i
Ht = (1 − τ
v
















where Nt(i) = NHt(i) + N∗
Ht(i) is total labor use by home ￿rm i which is split between
production for home and foreign markets. Given the expression for pro￿ts, the optimality
conditions for price setting can be characterized in the same way as in Section 3.1, the
description of which we leave for the Appendix. The dynamics of prices satis￿es similar




The other changes to the equilibrium system are largely notational. 44 Demand for
good i is now

















and we cannot in general take the price terms outside the brackets since the law of one
price does not hold under LCP. As a result, we now need to treat CHt and C∗
Ht as two
separate goods that have a non-unit relative price in general. The aggregate market
clearing conditions (22) are now replaced by



















and the same for foreign good. Labor market clearing (29) must be adjusted in a similar
way.
Importantly, the expressions for budget constraints of the countries under LCP are
exactly the same as those under PCP (for example, see equations (32) and (34)). 45
44Notation under LCP case is more general, since it does not require that the law of one price holds,
and equally applies under PCP, where a simpli￿cation is possible.
45 The only di￿erence in the budget constraint (30) under complete markets is that we need to write




t ), instead of PHtYt which is a
simpli￿cation under the law of one price. The same is true in the case of international trade in equities.







Ht, and similarly for Π∗
t. When domestic dividends are taxed, the tax must apply equally to
domestic and foreign operations.
32Generalization of the results The results of the PCP case extend directly: Propo-
sitions 6, 7, 8 and 9 hold with no change. This is because under the proposed ￿scal
devaluations, (FDD′) or (FDD′′), all four reset prices { ¯ PHt, ¯ P ∗
Ht, ¯ P ∗
Ft, ¯ P ∗
Ft} are left un-
changed relative to the nominal devaluation under consideration, for the same reasons
we discussed following the proof of Proposition 6. Given prices, the other equilibrium
relationships remain the same across LCP and PCP setups, and hence the results extend
immediately. The formal details are in the Appendix.
These conclusions equally apply under all the international asset market structures
we have considered￿perfect risk sharing, trade in risk-free bonds denominated in either
currency, and trade in equities. This underscores the robustness of the proposed ￿scal
devaluation policies, which can replicate the allocations under a nominal devaluation in
di￿erent environments, even though the allocations per se are di￿erent from one environ-
ment to the other.
3.5 Capital
In this section, we explain how our characterization of ￿scal devaluations change when
we introduce capital in the model. We have streamlined the exposition to emphasize
the main changes compared to the no-capital case. We start by summarizing the main
changes in the model and equilibrium conditions. We then explain how the results of the
no-capital case extend when capital is introduced in the model.
As we shall see shortly, when capital is added to the model, additional instruments are
required. Speci￿cally, we introduce an investment subsidy (an investment tax credit) ςI
t , a
tax on capital income τK
t , and a capital subsidy (a subsidy on the rental rate of capital) ςR
t .
The main conclusion is that once those instruments are introduced, our results generalize.
Furthermore, only a capital subsidy ςR




t = 0 simultaneously).
Equilibrium conditions We ￿rst describe the main changes in the model and its
equilibrium conditions. We adopt a formalization where ￿rms rent the services from
labor and capital on centralized markets, at prices Wt and Rt, and capital is accumulate
by households according to
Kt+1 = Kt (1 − δ) + It,
where gross investment It combines the di￿erent goods in the exact same way as the
consumption bundle Ct.






















t is an investment tax credit and τK
t is a tax on capital income.
The household ￿rst-order conditions are the same as in the model without capital.
But there is now one additional ￿rst-order condition for capital accumulation:
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33We now turn to producers. We assume that each ￿rm operates a neoclassical produc-
tion function, which for concreteness takes a Cobb-Douglas form:
Yt (i) = AtZt(i)Nt (i)
α Kt (i)
1−α ,
where Kt (i) is the ￿rm’s capital input. Pro￿ts are given by:
Π
i
t = (1 − τ
v
t )PHt(i)Yt(i) − (1 − ς
p




t is the capital subsidy. We can then solve the ￿rm’s problem. The optimal reset



















































Generalization of the results Consider ￿rst the complete markets case. Then a
￿scal {δt}-devaluation can be engineered exactly as in Proposition 6 supplemented with
the following tax adjustments. For (FDD ′) an investment subsidy and a tax on capital
income ςI
t = τK
t = δt are needed. For (FDD′′), a subsidy on the rental rate of capital
ςR
t = δt/(1 + δt) is also needed.
Consider now the incomplete markets case. Then, depending on the speci￿c asset mar-
ket structure, a ￿scal {δt}-devaluation can be engineered exactly as in Propositions 7￿9,
supplemented with the same tax adjustments on ςI
t , τK
t and ςR
t described in the previous
paragraph. Exactly as in Propositions 7￿9, in the case where the ￿scal devaluation is
one-time unexpected, one can dispense with the use of the consumption subsidy and in-





t = 0 for all t ≥ 0).
It is easiest to grasp the intuition for these results in the incomplete markets case,
when the devaluation is one-time unexpected. In this case, under (FDD ′), no further tax
adjustments are required when capital is introduced into the model. This is not so for
(FDD′′) where a subsidy on the rental rate of capital is needed: exactly for the same
reason that a payroll subsidy ς
p
t = δt/(1 + δt) is needed to o￿set the e￿ect of the VAT
τv
t = δt/(1 + δt), an equivalent subsidy on the rental rate of capital ςR
t = δt/(1 + δt)
is needed. In other words, a VAT-based ￿scal devaluation requires a uniform subsidy
to all variable inputs of production. Without this adjustment in rental rate subsidies,
￿rms would have incentives to substitute labor for capital in production under a ￿scal
devaluation￿an e￿ect absent in a nominal devaluation.
Outside of this case, the consumption subsidy ςc
t and the labor income tax τn
t cannot
be set to zero even without capital. Instead one must set ςc
t = τn
t = δt. This requires
also adjusting investment subsidy and a tax on capital income ςI
t = τK
t = δt so as not
to distort investment decisions of households. Note that the required adjustments on the
labor income and capital income taxes are the same. This is consistent with adjusting a
single tax on total income from both labor and capital.
344 Optimal Devaluation: Numerical Illustration
So far we have not focused on whether a devaluation is optimal or desirable; we have
simply asked whether it is possible to robustly replicate the real allocations that would
follow a nominal devaluation, but keeping the nominal exchange rate ￿xed. This is because
while the optimality of a devaluation is model dependent, equivalence, which is the focus
of this paper is robust across many environments.
There are cases when a devaluation is optimal going back to the argument Milton
Friedman made in favor of ￿exible exchange rates in an environment where prices are rigid
in the producer’s currency (for a recent formal analysis of this argument see Devereux and
Engel, 2007).46 In this section we examine another case where wages are rigid but prices
are ￿exible. In this environment the optimal policy response to a negative productivity
shock is a devaluation: nominal or ￿scal. 47
We provide a simple numerical illustration of this case. For simplicity, we consider
a small-open economy. The only international asset is a risk-free foreign-currency bond
traded at a constant rate r∗ such that β(1+r∗) = 1. We introduce money into the model
by way of a cash-in-advance constraint. The relevant parameters are chosen as follows:
β = 0.99, θw = 0.75, γ = 2/3, σ = 4, φ = 1, κ = 1, η = 3. Hence, a period corresponds to
a quarter and the average wage duration is one year. The choice of the utility parameters
does not a￿ect qualitative properties of the dynamics of the small open economy, as long
as the relative risk aversion is greater than one ( σ > 1).48
We consider the following experiment. The economy starts initially in a non-stochastic
steady state with productivity A0 = 1. At t = 1, home productivity permanently and
unexpectedly drops by 10%.49 Because home is a small open economy, all the foreign
variables remain unchanged. We consider equilibrium dynamic response to this shock
under two regimes. First, the economy implements the optimal nominal or ￿scal deval-
uation, and second, the economy maintains a ￿xed exchange rate and no change in the
￿scal policy.
Figure 1 describes the dynamic path for the economy under the two regimes. First,
consider the regime under which the exchange rate is devalued by 5%. Exactly the same
outcome could be achieved through a ￿scal devaluation, either by increasing import tari￿s
and export subsidies by 5 percentage points, or by lowering the payroll tax and increasing
the VAT by 5 percentage points (see Proposition 7, part (ii)).
This devaluation replicates the ￿exible-price, ￿exible-wage allocation with no wage
46Hevia and Nicolini (2011) propose a New Keynesian small-open-economy model with trade in com-
modities as intermediate inputs. In this environment, a nominal devaluation can be the constrained
optimal response to an exogenous terms-of-trade shock.
47Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2011) recently considered a similar environment, but with downward
nominal wage rigidity, inelastic labor supply and involuntary unemployment. In their environment, the
e￿ects of a nominal devaluation can be replicated with a single payroll subsidy, which as we show is in
general insu￿cient for a ￿scal devaluation.
48When  = 1, productivity does not a￿ect equilibrium nominal wage under ￿xed exchange rate, and
therefore wage stickiness is not a binding constraint in the experiment we consider below. For  < 1,
under ￿xed exchange rate nominal wages increase in response to a negative productivity shock.
49In our model, this drop in productivity given the nominal wage rate is equivalent to starting the
economy at an initial nominal wage which is too high given productivity and price level.
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Optimal Devaluation Fixed Exchange Rate
Figure 1: Dynamic path of the economy under optimal devaluation and ￿xed exchange
rate, following a one-time unanticipated 10% fall in productivity
Note: Optimal ￿scal devaluation is characterized by the same dynamics with the exception that the
nominal exchange rate is constant and taxes adjust instead as described in the text.
∗RER is real exchange rate. In this economy, changes in RER are proportional to changes in the terms
of trade, ˆ Q =  ˆ S, therefore the dynamics of RER are qualitatively the same as that for the terms of
trade, with RER being less volatile since  < 1.
36in￿ation. This allocation is perfectly constant: consumption drops, hours increase, out-
put drops, the real wage drops, and the terms of trade appreciate. Note that the net
foreign asset position remains at zero. Because the shock is permanent and the alloca-
tion constant, there are no additional opportunities for consumption smoothing through
international borrowing and lending.
One way to understand why a devaluation achieves the ￿exible-price, ￿exible-wage
outcome is as follows. With the productivity shock, two relative prices need to adjust:
the real wage and the terms of trade. The combination of a nominal or ￿scal devaluation
and a jump in the home price level is su￿cient to perfectly and instantly hit both targets,
while without a devaluation a jump in prices alone leads to both too high a real wage and
overappreciated terms of trade. Alternatively, one can think of the devaluation as a way
to achieve the desired real wage adjustment without any nominal wage adjustment. All
in all, a devaluation circumvents the sticky wage constraint. 50
Figure 1 also describes the dynamic path for the economy under ￿xed exchange rate￿
that is, an economy with neither nominal, nor ￿scal devaluation following the productivity
shock. Just like the ￿exible-price, ￿exible-wage economy, the sticky wage economy even-
tually achieves a lower real wage and an appreciated terms of trade. However, the initial
adjustment in the home price level cannot alone (without a simultaneous adjustment in
the nominal exchange rate) hit the two relative price targets that are the real wage and
the terms of trade of the ￿exible-price, ￿exible-wage economy. Instead, part of the ad-
justment now comes in the form of a protracted wage de￿ation. The initial increase in
the home price level results in a decrease in the real wage and appreciation of the terms
of trade. But the initial appreciation in the terms of trade overshoots its long run level￿
the terms of trade appreciates more in the short run￿while the real wage undershoots
its long term value￿the real wage decreases less in the short run. In other words, the
resulting short-run wage markup is too high, explaining why wage de￿ation takes place.
This in turn leads to depressed hours and a negative output gap. Finally, that the terms
of trade initially appreciate more than in the long run results in trade de￿cits, followed
by trade surpluses. The trade de￿cits that occur early on can be seen as symptoms of a
competitiveness problem.51
5 Discussion
In this paper we propose two types of ￿scal policies that can robustly implement allo-
cations stemming from a nominal devaluation, but in an economy with a ￿xed exchange
rate. Given the desired size of a devaluation, these policies require no additional informa-
tion about the microeconomic environment, in particular about the extent and nature of
nominal price and wage rigidity.
One interpretation of our results is that when ￿scal instruments are available, exchange
rate stability need not imply that ￿exible-exchange-rate allocations are no longer feasi-
50In our economy, ￿exible-price, ￿exible-wage allocation is the ￿rst best if monopolistic markups in
price and wage-setting are o￿set with appropriate subsidies.
51It is also possible to understand these developments from the perspective of the capital account.
While the shock is permanent, the transitional dynamics due to wage stickiness generates a recession in
the short run, the e￿ects of which on consumption can be smoothed through international borrowing.
37ble. The impossible trinity, or trilemma, in international macroeconomics refers to the
impossibility of having an independent monetary policy in an open economy with ￿xed
exchange rates and free capital mobility (for a recent reference, see Obstfeld, Shambaugh,
and Taylor, 2010). While it is indeed the case that ￿xed exchange rates and free capital
mobility restrict monetary independence since nominal interest rates are tied down by
a parity condition even in our framework, what we show is that when ￿scal policies are
added to the mix of instruments the allocations that are attainable are the same as those
with a ￿exible exchange rate, or independent monetary policy. Therefore the restrictive-
ness on monetary policy is without cost in this model. This result is in the spirit of Adao,
Correia, and Teles (2009).
Next we discuss a number of important implementation issues.
Non-uniform VAT and multiple variable inputs The implementability of ￿scal
devaluations may be limited by the fact that VAT often does not apply to certain non-
tradable services such as construction and housing, and labor is not the only variable
factor of production for the ￿rms. As we explained in footnote 8, an exact VAT-based
￿scal devaluation requires either that an increase in VAT applies uniformly to all home-
produced goods, including all non-tradables, or that reduction in payroll tax extends only
to the industries that face an increase in the VAT. Therefore, non-uniform application of
the VAT does not limit considerably the implementability of a VAT-based devaluation.
Our baseline assumption that labor is the only variable factor (apart from intermedi-
ates) is probably good in the short run. Hence our baseline analysis should still apply in
the short-run when the most real e￿ects of a devaluations are realized. The presence of
intermediates as another variable input does not a￿ect our results, as long as the increase
in the VAT and the reduction in the payroll tax equally apply to the intermediate-good
sectors. The plausibility of the assumption that labor is the only variable input decreases
over time: at longer horizons there are other variable inputs in production. Then the
government needs to subsidize uniformly these other factors, alongside with labor (again
apart from intermediates). We illustrated this logic in the case of capital in Section 3.5,
but this principle is more general.
How large a ￿scal devaluation and non-zero initial taxes There is no exogenous
restriction on the size of a nominal devaluation, that is δ ∈ (0,+∞). What are the
restrictions on the maximal size of a ￿scal devaluation given that taxes cannot exceed
100%? Theoretically a ￿scal devaluation of arbitrary size δ ≥ 0 is also possible. Consider
the implementation using VAT and payroll subsidy only. In this case, a δ-devaluation
requires setting VAT and payroll subsidy at δ/(1 + δ) ∈ (0,1).
What if there were initial non-zero VAT and payroll taxes in place? Then the required
new taxes under a ￿scal δ-devaluation are:52
τ
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,
where ¯ τv and ¯ τp are the pre-devaluation levels of VAT and payroll taxes. Note that for
any size of devaluation δ, we still have τv < 1 and ςp ≡ −τp < 1. Interestingly, the larger
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1+δ , and analogously for the payroll tax.
38is the initial level of VAT, the smaller is a required further increase in the VAT to achieve
a given level of devaluation.
Revenue Neutrality The proposed ￿scal devaluations are revenue-neutral in the sense
that they do not lead to an increase in the primary de￿cit of the government. This is cru-
cial for the viability of ￿scal devaluations for many countries that consider implementing a
competitive devaluation given the already high level of indebtedness of their governments.
We discuss here two quali￿cations to the revenue-neutrality result. First, the full ￿scal
devaluation policy which includes changes in consumption and income taxes (e.g., as in
Proposition 6) is robustly revenue-neutral state-by-state and period-by-period. However,
as pointed out in footnote 26, a ￿scal devaluation which relies exclusively on the swap
between payroll tax and VAT without adjusting consumption and income taxes generates
￿scal surpluses that are proportional to trade de￿cits in a given period and state. There-
fore, to the extent trade is balanced in the long run, ￿scal devaluations in this case are
revenue neutral in the long run.
Second, all the results on revenue neutrality of ￿scal devaluations are over and above
the ￿scal revenue e￿ects of a nominal devaluation. In a setup with non-zero initial taxes,
nominal devaluations generally have an e￿ect on ￿scal revenues, for example by means of
stimulating employment and output. Fiscal devaluations have exactly the same e￿ect on
government revenues, and this is the sense in which they are revenue neutral. 53
Tax Pass-through We discuss our assumptions on the sensitivity of prices to exchange
rate and tax changes and relate it to existing empirical evidence. We restrict attention to
the VAT-cum-payroll tax policy given its greater implementability. The propositions on
equivalence rely on two sets of assumptions that would be normal to impose in a standard
new Keynesian environment: One, foreign ￿rms pass-through of exchange rate and VAT
changes into the prices at which they sell to the domestic market is the same, all else
equal, that is conditional on the foreign wage. Two, domestic ￿rms pass-through of VAT
and payroll tax to domestic prices is the same, conditional on the domestic wage.
In the long-run, when prices are fully ￿exible these assumptions are natural. When
the exchange rate and tax changes are large the long-run can be attained very quickly
since ￿rms will choose to adjust prices immediately. The question then is about the short-
run, when as a large body of evidence suggests, prices adjust infrequently and respond
sluggishly to shocks.
We now survey what empirical evidence exists on the short-run response of prices to
exchange rate and tax policy changes. The ￿rst assumption requires symmetry of pass-
through of exchange rate shocks and VAT shocks into foreign ￿rms prices to the domestic
53To be precise, ￿scal and nominal devaluations have the same e￿ect on government revenues in foreign
currency terms, which would be exactly the right benchmark if much of the government debt is denom-
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39market. Since existing papers in the literature do not directly address this question,
one is necessarily comparing evidence across di￿erent data sets and more importantly
comparing cases where the tax shocks and exhange rate shocks are not necessarily similarly
unanticipated or anticipated. Nevertheless, what evidence exists appears to support the
assumption of similar pass-through rates. For instance, Campa, Goldberg, and GonzÆlez-
M￿nguez (2005) estimate that short-run (one month) pass-through into import prices in
the Euro Area is 66% (and 81% in the long-run, after four months). Andrade, CarrØ,
and BØnassy-QuØrØ (2010) examine data on French exports to the Euro zone over the
1996-2005 period and document that median pass-through of VAT shocks that occurred
in eleven EMU12 partner countries over this period is 70-82% at a one year horizon. While
they lack higher frequency data they conclude that the evidence is consistent with similar
pass-through behavior for exchange rate and VAT shocks over a year. The evidence also
appears consistent with producer currency pricing.
Evidence on the second assumption on responses of domestic prices to VAT and payroll
is even harder to come by. First, while there exist some studies on VAT pass-through at
various horizons there are very few equivalent studies for payroll taxes. Carbonnier (2007)
studies two French reforms that involved steep decreases in VAT in 1987 and then in 1999
and ￿nds that the pass-through into domestic prices, almost immediately, was 57% in the
new car sales market and 77% in the household repair services market. The extent of
pass-through therefore varies by market. There is however no similar evidence for payroll
tax changes in these markets. Further, the tax changes were of a very large magnitude and
consequently more revealing of long-run pass-through. 54 The one case study that involved
both a VAT increase and a payroll tax cut is the German VAT increase of 3 percentage
points and a cut in employer and employee payroll contributions by 2.3 percentage points
in 2007. Carare and Danninger (2008) examine the e￿ect of these policy changes on core
in￿ation. They ￿nd evidence of staggered price adjustment to tax shocks. The tax policies
were announced 13 months ahead of actual implementation and, consistent with infrequent
price adjustment, they ￿nd that prices adjusted upward prior to implementation. They
conclude that overall pass-through from VAT was 73% with about half of this occurring
in the run-up to implementation and the other half at the time of implementation. This
evidence however cannot be directly used to shed light on the symmetry assumption.
Firstly, they focus on core in￿ation and do not distinguish between domestic and foreign
price pass-through. Secondly, they provide no evidence on pass-through of the payroll
tax. Given that their identi￿cation relies on comparing VAT-e￿ected goods with non-
VAT goods, they isolate only the VAT pass-through component. This evidence also does
not shed light on unanticipated tax changes.
The existing evidence therefore does not shed much light on the second assumption.
Consequently, we brie￿y discuss how the equivalence proposition is impacted in the case
of short-run asymmetry in pass-through rates between VAT and payroll tax. Most of the
intuition can be conveyed using the static model of Section 2. Speci￿cally, suppose that
prices in the producer currency, while sticky in the short-run, can be indexed to VAT and
54In September 1987, the VAT rate on car sales went down from the luxury-rate of 33.33% to the
full-rate of 18.6%. In September 1999, the VAT rate on housing repair services went down from the
full-rate of 20.6% to the reduced-rate of 5.5%
















Here ξp and ξv measures the extent of indexation to the payroll subsidy and VAT respec-
tively. Under these circumstances, a ￿scal δ-devaluation can be implemented by means
of one of the two policies:
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When there is no asymmetry in pass-through between VAT and payroll tax (i.e., ξv = ξp),
or when prices are fully ￿exible (θp = 0), both policies imply our previous result (τ v =
ςp = δ/(1 + δ), as in Proposition 1). When VAT pass-through is higher that that of
a payroll tax (ξv > ξp), the ￿rst ￿scal-devaluation policy prescribes to move both VAT
and payroll subsidy by more than δ/(1+δ), while the second leaves VAT unchanged and
increases the payroll subsidy by more. The only case when equivalence breaks down is
when ξv = 1, ξp = 0 and θp = 1, that is the case of extreme asymmetry in the pass-
through of taxes and fully ￿xed prices. Derivations and further details of this analysis
can be found in the Appendix.
Implementation in a monetary union We ￿nally turn to the most pressing issue￿
how to implement a ￿scal devaluation in a monetary union, where the member-countries
give up their monetary policy independence and adopt a common currency hence aban-
doning the possibility of a nominal devaluation. In fact, current circumstances in the
Euro Zone are the principal source of motivation for our analysis.
Generally, our proposed ￿scal devaluations require a change in money supply at home.
Note, however, that with cash-in-advance and under certain asset market structures (see
Proposition 1 in the static analysis section), a change in money supply is not needed, and a
￿scal devaluation can be implemented by means of a consumption subsidy only. Scenarios
where changes in the home money supply are required raise interesting implementation
questions in the context of a currency union, where money supply is controlled by a union
central bank. In these cases, implementation may call for an increase in money supply
by the union central bank with the seignorage income from this policy transferred to the
home country.55 Equivalently, the union central bank can let the national central bank of
the country under consideration print the required money. Such implementations cannot
55Formally, the monetary union’s central bank controls total money supply to all union members, as
well as transfers of seigniorage income to individual countries, while money supply to individual countries
is determined endogenously in order to maintain ￿xed exchange rate. In the empirically relevant limiting
case as seigniorage income constitutes negligible share of country’s GDP (and in particular in the cashless
limit), the transfer of seigniorage income becomes inessential.
41be thought of as a unilateral policy change by the home country. However, when home is
small relative to the overall size of the currency union, no coordinated policy by the union
central bank is needed, and a ￿scal devaluation can be achieved by the home’s unilateral
change in ￿scal policy. The formal analysis of implementation in a monetary union is
provided in the Appendix.56
56Implementation in a currency union is additionally constrained by the mobility of labor across coun-
tries, while we assume throughout international immobility of labor. However, since our proposed ￿scal
devaluations have the same real e￿ects as those of a nominal devaluation, the consequences of both types
of policies for international labor movements must also be the same.
42A Derivations for Section 3
A.1 Consumer problem and wage setting


































































t denotes the value of the household at t upon adjusting its wage, and ¯ Jh
t is the
value of the household which does not adjust its wage at t. In this later case, ¯ W h
t = ¯ W h
t−1.

































taking Nt, Wt and other prices as given, and given individual state vector (Bh
t ,Mh
t−1).
Substitute labor demand into the utility and the budget constraint, and denote by µh
t
a Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Note that there exists a separate budget
constraint for each state of the world at each date. The description of the state of the
world includes whether the household resets its wage rate. State-contingent bonds allow
risk to be shared across states to when households adjust and do not adjust its wage.
Because a wage-adjusting event is an idiosyncratic risk, Θt+1, and hence µh
t+1, do not
depend on whether the household adjusts its wage. Using this fact, we can manipulate
the ￿rst order and envelope conditions for the household problem, to obtain the expression
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Now consider the optimality condition for the choice of ¯ W h
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Combining these two conditions and solving forward imposing a terminal condition, we






























s and doing standard manipulations results in the wage-setting condition
(27) provided in the text.
43A.2 Proof of Proposition 9: International trade in equities
Money demand, market clearing, good demand, and wage and price-setting equations
(including international prices) are exactly as in Section 3.1, and we do not reproduce
them. We only consider the equilibrium conditions that are di￿erent￿the risk-sharing
equations (36) and the budget constrains (35).



















































Substituting these expressions into (36), one can directly verify that the equilibrium al-
location of a nominal devaluation continues to satisfy (36) under both proposed (FDD ′)
and (FDD′′) and a constant nominal exchange rate.
Now we need to combine the home household budget constraint (35) with that for
the home government to arrive at the home country budget constraint. The same can, of
course, be done for the foreign, but it is redundant due to Walras Law. Recall that the
home government budget constraint is given by













































Combining this with (35) and manipulating the expression (in particular, making use of

































− (ωt+1 − ωt)Et {Θt+1Vt+1}.
The LHS of this equality re￿ects home’s Current Account de￿cit￿the sum of international
movement of dividend income (from home to foreign) and home’s trade de￿cit. The RHS
is the Capital Account￿adjustments in international portfolio positions (reallocation of
portfolio shares towards foreign). We now do the ￿nal manipulation by dividing the
country budget constraint by Et and applying the fact that home’s and foreign’s valuation












































44By substituting in the expression for pro￿ts, one can directly verify that this budget
constraint holds for the same allocation (including portfolio share {ωt,ω∗
t}) under nominal
devaluation and under both ￿scal devaluations of Proposition 9.
Now consider the case of an unanticipated devaluation in the absence of consumption
subsidy and income tax (ς c
t = τn
t = 0). Note that the country budget constraint is
not a￿ected by these two ￿scal instruments, as long as dividend-income tax is in place
as before, so it continues to hold. Furthermore, the risk-sharing conditions (36) also
continue to hold even in the absence of a consumption subsidy when devaluation at t = T
is unanticipated. This is because for t < T, exchange rate is expected to remain constant
with probability 1, and no tax change is expected with positive probability, so risk-sharing
is the same across devaluations for t < T. For t ≥ T, once nominal or ￿scal devaluation has
happened, no further change is expected and previous change does not a￿ect risk-sharing
going forward (formally, Es/Et = 1 for all s ≥ t, and any change in taxes simply scales
pro￿ts in all future periods and states without causing the agents in the two countries to
disagree on the valuation of the ￿rms at their current portfolio holdings￿see (36)).
This completes the proof as we demonstrated that the same allocation (real allocations,
including portfolio shares, wages, producer prices) satisfy all the equilibrium conditions
under both nominal and ￿scal devaluations. 
A.3 Dynamic analysis with LCP


























respectively, and where the expressions for pro￿ts from domestic and foreign operations
are provided in the text. Note that labor demand of the ￿rm for the two operation











the demand equations for CHt(i) and C∗
Ht(i) are the same as under PCP (see Section 3.1).
Taking the ￿rst-order conditions for price setting and manipulating them in the same way



































































where we dropped ￿rm-identi￿er i because all ￿rms adjusting prices at t are symmetric
and set the same prices. Note that the law of one price no longer holds in general. Finally,





















45where now we need to keep track separately of the home-good prices at home and abroad.
As under PCP, ¯ PHt and ¯ P ∗
Ht are the price indexes for ￿rms resetting their prices at t.
Similar equations (with all taxes and subsidies set to zero for ¯ P ∗
Ft and with only import
tax a￿ecting ¯ PFt) describe optimal price setting and price dynamics by foreign ￿rms. 57























All other equations, including country budget constraints and risk-sharing conditions
under all asset-market structures, remain the same (see remarks in footnote 45).
We can now extend the PCP results to the case of LCP:
Complete markets (extension of Proposition 6) We only need to verify that
{ ¯ PHt, ¯ P ∗
Ht, ¯ P ∗
Ft, ¯ PFt} stay unchanged under (FDD′) and (FDD′′) relative to a nominal




also stay unchanged. The rest of the proof is exactly the same as that of Proposition 6
in the text, since all remaining blocks of the equilibrium system are unchanged under
LCP relative to PCP (in particular the perfect risk-sharing condition (21)). This is intu-
itive since the di￿erence between LCP and PCP is only in the price-setting block of the
equilibrium system.
Incomplete markets (extension of Propositions 7-9) As above, under LCP all
price setting and price dynamics remain unchanged across ￿scal and nominal devaluations.
As we argued in the main text, country budget constraints under LCP are the same as
those under PCP. The same is true for risk-sharing conditions under all asset-market
structures. Therefore, again the remainder of the proofs directly extend from the PCP









































Clearly, a nominal-devaluation allocation still satis￿es this risk-sharing condition under
both (FDD′) and (FDD′′).













































Ft satis￿es a similar expressions, but without (1 − v
t )=[(1 + m
s )Es] in the denominator.
46B Asymmetric Tax Pass-through
Consider the static economy with imperfect risk sharing (e.g., an exogenous net foreign
asset position, B = Bh +Bf∗E) and producer currency pricing for concreteness. We only
consider the VAT-based devaluation (without the use of consumption subsidy and income
tax), as nothing changes for the tari￿-based devaluation. To maintain focus on the issue
of asymmetric pass-through of taxes into home prices, we assume that exchange rate
and VAT have the same pass-through into international prices, in line with the reviewed
empirical literature.
The wages are set according to (5), while home price is now partially indexed to VAT
and payroll tax changes, as in (37). The remaining equilibrium conditions, including the
law of one price equations (7)￿(8), are exactly as in Section 2, despite the di￿erent price
setting rule. In particular, the market clearing for home and foreign goods (1) and the









































is the terms of trade. Note that P = kPHS1−γ and P ∗ = kP ∗
FS−(1−γ). We conclude
from these equations, together with those for W ∗ and P ∗
F,58 that as long as S remains
unchanged across devaluations, so do (P ∗,P ∗
F,W ∗,C,C∗,Y,Y ∗).
Therefore, we only need to ensure that taxes are such that home wage and price setting
indeed ensure that S remains unchanged across nominal and ￿scal devaluations. Given
this, we can always select M to satisfy the cash in advance constraint. Combining (5)







where Z = S/P ∗
F = E/[PH(1 − τv)] and










are the terms that remain unchanged across nominal and ￿scal devaluations. Expressing
PH as a function of Z and E/(1−τv) and doing some basic manipulations, we can rewrite
58Note that














)1−(1−θw)(1−θp) (1 − τv)ξvθp+(1−θp)
(1 − ςp)ξpθp+(1−θp) = κZ
1−γ(1−θw)(1−θp).
The right-hand side must be the same under ￿scal and nominal devaluations, which
imposes restrictions on admissible VAT-cum-payroll subsidy policies. We consider two
classes of policies￿(i) τv = ςp = τ and (ii) τv = δ/(1 + δ) and ςv = τ￿and solve for τ in
these two cases which results in the formulas in the text.
Note that ￿scal devaluations in the case of asymmetric pass-through depend on the
details of the micro environment, such as pass-through ξv and ξp, and price and wage
stickiness θp and θw. The latter suggests that in a dynamic environment ￿scal devalua-
tions will involve dynamic tax policies even in order to replicate the e￿ects of a one-time
unanticipated nominal devaluation. Indeed this can be veri￿ed in the dynamic environ-
ment. One caveat is that now the equivalence holds only as a ￿rst order approximation
because it introduces relative price dispersion across ￿rms that already have and have
yet to adjust their prices￿a side e￿ect of di￿erential pass-through of taxes (but not of
exchange rate) across adjusters and non-adjusters. Furthermore, one can show that in a
dynamic model, the second proposed policy involves a once-and-for-all hike in VAT and
an overshooting payroll subsidy (large initial hike and then geometric decrease towards
the long-run value of δ/(1 + δ), where the speed of this decrease depends on the extent
of price stickiness). Importantly, this policy can still be implemented without the use of
consumption subsidy and income tax, despite the fact that it involves some anticipated
changes in payroll taxes.
48C Implementation in a Monetary Union
Consider the dynamic model. In a monetary union, countries give up monetary indepen-
dence, and delegate monetary policy to a union central bank. As a result, the home’s
national government budget constraint becomes
Tt + Ωt + TRt = 0,
where Ωt denotes transfers from the union central bank, and again assuming (without loss
of generality due to Ricardian equivalence) that the government runs a balanced budget.
The foreign’s national government budget constraint is now T ∗
t + Ω∗
t = 0.
Naturally, since members of a currency union adopt the same currency, we have
Et ≡ ¯ E = 1.
The union central bank supplies money ¯ Mt and transfers the proceeds of seigniorage to
the national governments:
¯ Mt − ¯ Mt−1 + Ωt + Ω
∗
t = 0.
Total money supply is equal to ¯ Mt, while we denote money demand by Mt and M∗
t in
home and foreign respectively. Money market clearing requires
¯ Mt = Mt + M
∗
t .
Finally, the policy variables now are union money supply and transfers of seigniorage
revenues, { ¯ Mt,Ωt,Ω∗
t}, along with ￿scal policies of the national governments. Currency
(money) supply to the member-states is now endogenous (e￿ectively ensuring a constant
nominal exchange rate), with union-wide money supply given by ¯ Mt.
The remainder of the equilibrium system stays unchanged, including household bud-
get constraints in home and foreign. Denote with primes ′ the counterfactual values of
variables under a ￿scal devaluation when countries are not part of a monetary union. Sec-
tion 3 described how to implement a ￿scal devaluation under these circumstances using
￿scal policies and national money supply. It is immediately obvious that implementing
a ￿scal devaluation in a monetary union requires, apart from adopting the same ￿scal
policies, that union-wide money supply follows:





that is, exactly mimics the aggregate money supply in the two economies under a ￿scal
devaluation when they are not part of a monetary union. 59 If this is not followed, money
demands would not be satis￿ed at the nominal-devaluation allocations.
When international asset markets are complete, this is the only required policy of
the union central bank, since state-contingent-bond positions in the decentralized asset
markets will take care of the transfers of seigniorage across countries. Outside the case of








59Clearly, this implicitly assumes Et ≡ 1 for all t ≥ 0 under a ￿scal devaluation without currency union,
otherwise we need to normalize all home-currency variables by E0.
49That is, since we considered the case of passive monetary policy by the foreign under a
nominal devaluation, foreign earns no seigniorage revenues in that case. All seigniorage
revenues from the monetary slackening by home remains with the home central bank
under a nominal or ￿scal devaluation without a currency union. This has to be mimicked
under the monetary union as well, by having the union central bank make corresponding
transfers of union-wide seigniorage to national governments.
This fully characterizes implementation under a monetary union. Mt and M∗
t en-
dogenously adjust to satisfy money demands at the nominal-devaluation allocations. To
summarize, in general, implementation in a monetary union requires active monetary pol-
icy by the union central bank, as well as a particular transfer policy of the corresponding
seigniorage to the national governments.
There are two important special cases however (apart from the trivial case in which
∆M′
t = ∆M∗′
t = 0), when the required actions by the union central bank are reduced.
First consider the limiting case of χ → 0, in which money demand shrinks, holding
constant consumption, prices and interest rates. For concreteness, consider σ = ν = 1, so






that is, money demand shrinks relative to the nominal expenditure of the economy. In this
case, Ωt = ∆M′
t becomes increasingly a more trivial component of home-economy revenues
and expenditures, and in the limit it is zero. This means that when χ ≈ 0, transfers of
seigniorage from the union central bank are (nearly) inconsequential for allocations in the
economy.
The other special case is that of a small home relative to the size of the monetary
union (in particular, in terms of money demand). In this case, Mt/ ¯ Mt → 0, and hence
∆ ¯ Mt/ ¯ Mt = ∆M′
t/ ¯ Mt → 0. Therefore, there is no need for the union central bank to alter
union-wide money supply. Existing money supply endogenously relocate from foreign to
home in response to a ￿scal devaluation, without causing consequences for foreign due to
the small (negligible) economic size of home. When χ ≫ 0, replicating a ￿scal devaluation
under a currency union additionally requires a (negligibly small from the point of view
of foreign) transfer to home in the size of ∆M′
t (which might, however, not be negligible
for home). Taking the limit χ → 0, again makes the size of the transfer negligible, and
under these circumstances a ￿scal devaluation can be implemented in the monetary union
without any actions by the union central banks or exogenous transfers between the union
members.
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